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JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) this Court has appellate
jurisdiction over a judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals. Further, pursuant to Utah
.

.

Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5), the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear this appeal
in an order dated July 6, 2016.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding Petitioner's suit must be
dismissed for failure to bring its subrogation action in the name of its insured.

Standard of Review: "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same
standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous."

State v. Harmon, 910 P. 2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995) ( citing Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P .2d
97, 101 n.2 (Utah 1992).
Interpretation of statutes and decisional precedents are reviewed for correctness.

See MacFarlane v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2006 UT 25,

,r 9, 134 P.3d 1116 ("A matter

of statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review on appeal for correctness."
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Adoption ofA.F.K., 2009
UT App 198, ,r 16, 216 P.3d 980 (explaining that "issues that require interpretation of
prior decisional precedents" are "questions of law that are reviewed for correctness"
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).

1

Preservation in Record: This issue was preserved at numerous points before the

trial court, including R. at 457-75; R. at 821. 1 This issue also arose when the Utah Court
of Appeals rendered its decision on February 25, 2015. Petitioner requested certiorari to
hear this issue on March 24, 2016. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 18-19. The statement of this
issue is taken verbatim from this Courts' order granting certiorari on July 6, 2016.
Issue 2: Whether Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provided an alternative

to dismissal of Petitioner's complaint.
Sta°:dard of Review: "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of

appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same
standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous."

Harmon, 910 P. 2d at 1199.
"[T]he interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for
correctness." Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ,r 15, 16 P.3d 540.
Preservation in Record: This issue arose when the Utah Court of Appeals

rendered its decision on February 25, 2015. Petitioner requested certiorari to hear this
issue on March 24, 2016. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 18-19. The statement of this issue is
taken verbatim from this Courts' order granting certiorari on July 6, 2016.

1

In this brief, the court record of pleadings and papers shall be referred to as "R. page.
number."
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
STATUTES:
Utah Code Annotated Section§ 31A-21-108: Subrogation actions
Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its
insured.

RULES:
Rule 17 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (in relevant part):
(a) Real p ~ in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute
may sue in that person's name without joining the party for· whose benefit
the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use
or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No
action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after
objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or
substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced
in the name of the real party in interest.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Appellant/Petitioner, Educators Mutual Insurance Association ("EMIA"), appeals
the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion Wilson v. Educators Mutual Insurance Association,
2016 UT App 38, 368 P.3d 471\ A true and correct copy of said opinion is attached
hereto and hereby incorporated as Addend. A. Appellees/Respondents in this matter are
Everett P. Wilson Jr. and Darla Wilson ("Wilsons"). The nature of this appeal focuses on
whether an insurer has the right to bring a subrogation action in its own name or if the

3

insurer must bring the action in the name of the insured. This appeal focuses secondarily
on the question of if an insurer must bring a subrogation action in th~ name of the
insured, but the insurer instead brings the action in its own name, is dismissal of the
subrogation claim required, or does Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provide an

®

alternative to dismissal.
Jessica Wilson, an insured ofEMIA, was struck by a car while crossing the road
and passed away shortly thereafter from her injuries. R. at 571. EMIA paid for Jessica
Wilson's medical treatment. R. at 561. Jessica Wilson's parents filed a wrongful death
claim against the driver for burial expenses and compensation for loss of their daughter's

@

society, love, companionship, protection, and affection. R. at 570. EMIA filed a
subrogation claim in its own name against the driver to recoup the expenses EMIA had

,,,,
\!!i,I

paid for Jessica Wilson's medical treatment following the accident. R. at ·771-7 5. EMIA
and Wilsons' cases were consolidated. R. at 541. The liability insurance carrier for the
tortfeasor interplead the driver's policy limit-$100,000-to be allocated by the district
court, and EMIA and the Wilsons released their claims against the driver. R. at 543. The
district court entered its Findings ofFact, Conclusions ofLaw and Order Regarding
Allocation oflnterpleader Amount Deposited with the Court (attached as Addend. B),
allocating $24,182.31 to EMIA, and $75,817.69 to the Wilsons. R. at 844.

Course of Proceedings/Disposition in the Lower Courts
EMIA filed a subrogation claim against the tortfeasor to recoup the expenses
EMIA had paid for Jessica Wilson's medical treatment following the accident. R. at 77175. The tortfeasor moved to dismiss EMIA's claim, challenging EMIA's standing to
4
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bring its suit. R. at 560-61. The district court entered an order (attached as Addend. C)
denying the motion to dismiss, adjudging tl?-at El\1IA had standing to bring an action for
subrogation under Utah's Subrogation Statute, and to do so in its own name. R. at 821.
El\1IA and Wilsons' cases were consolidated. R. at 541. The liability insurance carrier

interplead the driver's policy limit-$100,000-to be allocated by the court, and EMIA
and the Wilsons released their claims against the driver. R. at 543.
The district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLaw and Order

Regarding Allocation oflnterpleader Amount Deposited with the Court, allocating
$24,182.31 to EMIA, and $75,817.69 to the Wilsons. R. at 844. The Wilsons filed a
Notice of Appeal on February 27, 2015. R. at 759. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3102(4) the Utah Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals on or
about March 19, 2015. R. at 763.
After briefing and oral argument, the Utah Court of Appeals rendered its opi!1ion
on February 25, 2016. That opinion reversed the decision of the Fourth Judicial District
Court on the basis that EMIA lacked standing to bring its subrogation claim against the
tortfeasor in its own name, and remanded the matter with instructions that EMIA' s claims
be dismissed. Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ,r 13, 368 P.3d 471. Because the Utah Court_ of
Appeals determined that EMIA lacked standing, the other issues pres~nted by the
Wilsons on appeal were not addressed directly in its opinion. Id. at ,r 7. EMIA sought
review of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision, filing its Petition for Writ of Certiorari on
March 24, 2016. Certiorari was granted by the Utah Supreme Court in an order dated July
6, 2016.
5

Statement of Facts
On or about September 19, 2010, Jessica Wilson was walking in a crosswalk on
the campus of Brigham Young University when she was struck by a car driven by Cade
Krueger (the "tortfeasor"). R. at 571. Jessica Wilson was severely injured as a result and
later passed away. Id.
At all times relevant to this matter, Jessica Wilson was insured through EMIA for
medical expenses. R. at 843. The medical policy contains provisions and terms governing
EMIA's right to reimbursement and subrogation. R. at 624-25. See generally R. at 60585 (setting forth full medical policy). As a result of the automobile accident caused by the
tortfeasor, EMIA paid medical expenses on behalf of Jessica Wilson in the amount of
$78,692.34. R. at 772.
EMIA and the Wilsons filed separate claims against the tortfeasor; EMIA sued for
reimbursement, including interest, of the medical expenses it paid in behalf of Jessica
Wilson that were incurred when the tortfeasor' s vehicle struck her, and Wilsons sued the
tortfeasor for the wrongful death of Jessica Wilson.R. at 843.
The tortfeasor filed a motion to dismiss EMIA's suit, arguing that EMIA lacked
standing to bring its suit. R. at 560-61 The district court entered an order denying the
motion to dismiss, adjudging that EMIA had standing to bring an action for subrogation
under Utah's Subrogation Statute, and to do so in its own name. R. at 821.
The claims filed by EMIA and the Wilsons were consolidated and the parties
stipulated to release and dismiss the tortfeasor from the lawsuit upon the tortfeasor

6
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interpleading $100,000-the tortfeasor insurance liability policy limit-with the trial
court. R. at 543, 841.
Upon weighing the equities between Wilsons and EMIA, the trial court ordered
that Wilsons receive $75,817.69 of the interpleaded funds, while EMIA received
$24,182.31. R. at 840-44.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Utah Court of Appeals erred in concluding that EMIA lacked standing to
pursue a subrogation action in its own name and in concluding that neither Utah's
subrogation statute nor Utah's case law grant in insurer the right to pursue a subrogation
action in its own name. Utah case law going back to the tum of the twentieth century
clearly holds that a subrogating insurer is a real party in interest in a subrogation
proceeding and may maintain its subrogation action in its own name. No case or statute
has altered this real party in interest rule, and insurers continue to bring subrogation
actions in either their own name or the name of their insured. Until the court of appeals
decision in this matter, no Utah appellate court has questioned the insurer's right to
maintain a subrogation action in its own name in the last seventy years.
In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals relied heavily on the 1944 case,
Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98 (Utah 1944). This reliance on Johanson is
misplaced primarily because the portions of Johanson quoted by the court of appeals
were not the law the Johanson Court adopted; the Johanson Court first analyzed the
different positions taken by other states (including the portions quoted by the court of
appeals) before adopting a completely contrary position.

7

The court of appeals ignores several policy implications including how its decision
would alter what losses an insurer is willing to cover, how insurers will likely be required

~

to raise insurance premiums, and how the court of appeals' decision would make it
impossible for an insurer to recover in instances where an insured passes away from the
actions or inactions of a tortfeasor. Also, while not central to the issues here on appeal,
the court of appeals~ opinion includes problematic dicta concerning an heirs' supposed
superior right to reimbursement over an insurer when an insured passes away. This
language, unless addressed, will likely cause confusion in future cases where insureds
pass away from the actions or inactions of a tortfeasor.
Finally, even if the court of appeals was correct that an insurer cannot bring a
subrogation action in its own name, the court of appeals was incorrect to dismiss EMIA's
action. Rather, Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides an alternative to
dismissal.
ARGUMENT
THE DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD BE
REVERSED BECAUSE ITS INTERPRETATION OF UT AH CODE
ANNOTATED§ 31A-21-108 WAS INCORRECT, AND THE DECISION WAS
CONTRARY TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 17 OF THE UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
As this Court has instructed, "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same
standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous."
State v. Harmon, 910 P. 2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995).

8
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In this matter the decision· of the Utah Court of Appeals should be reversed
primarily for two reasons: (1) the Utah Court nf Appeals' interpretation of Utah Code

Ann.§ 31A-21-108 was incorrect; and (2) even assuming that the Utah Court of Appeals'
interpretation was correct, remanding the matter to the trial court with instructions to
dismiss EMJA's claims was a violation of Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

I.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' INTERPRETATION OF§ 31A-21-108
WAS INCORRECT.
Utah Code Ann. § 3 lA-21-108 provides "[s]ubrogation actions may be brought by

the insurer in the name of its insured." The court of appeals held§ 3 lA-21-108 does not
give EMIA standing to bring a subrogation action in its own name. See Wilson, 2016 UT
App 38, ,r 8, 12,368 P.3d 471. Interpretation of statutes and decisional precedents are
reviewed for correctness. MacFarlane, 2006 UT 25, ,r 9, 134 P.3d 1116; In re Adoption

ofA.F.K., 2009 UT App 198, ,r 16,216 P.3d 980.
In this matter, the court of appeals' construction of§ 31A-21-108 is untenable for
several reasons and its decision should be reversed. First, the manner in which the court
of appeals interpreted the permissive "may" in§ 3 lA-21-108 nullifies the effect of the
statute because the right for an insurer to subrogate already exists at common law.
Second, Utah case law illustrates that insurers regularly bring subrogation actions in their
own names, and have before the enactment of§ 3 IA-21-108. Third, the court of appeals
misapplied Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98 (Utah 1944). Fourth, the
manner in which the court of appeals interpreted§ 3 lA-21-108 would make it impossible
for an insurer to subrogate against· a tortfeasor if the insured dies as a result of a
9
....

tortfeasor's negligence. Fifth, the court of appeals' interpretation of§ 31A-21-108 creates
serious policy issues. Finally, the court of appeals cited incorrectly to case law to support
its proposition that heirs have a superior right of recovery.

A.

UNDER THE COURT OF APPEALS' REASONING, THERE WOULD
HAVE BEEN NO NEED TO ENACT§ 31A-21-108.

The manner in which the court of appeals construed §3 lA-21-108 nullifies the
effect of the statute and makes it meaningless. The court of appeals examined the
common law to determine whether an insurer may bring a subrogation action in its own
name, stating, "a suit at law to enforce such right of subrogation must, at common law, be
brought in the name of the insured, rather than by the insurance company in its own name
and right." Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, 110, 368 P.3d 471 (quoting Johanson, 152 P.2d at
104). The court of appeals' reliance on Johansen is misplaced for reasons that will be
discussed in Section I(C) of this Brief. However, if the common law already allowed an
insurer to bring a subrogation action in the name of the insured, as the court of appeals
asserts, then there would have been no reason for the legislature to enact §3 lA-21-108, as
under the court of appeals' interpretation of the statue, its only effect is to allow insurers
to bring a subrogation action in the name of an insured.

B.

A REVIEW OF UTAH'S SUBROGATION CASE LAW SHOWS THAT
UNDER UTAH LAW !HE SUB~OGATING INSURER HAS_ LONG BEEN
REGARDED AS A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST WITH A RIGHT TO
BRING A SUBROGATION ACTION IN ITS OWN NAME.

The Utah Court of Appeals stated, "Our review of Utah case law convinces us that
... no independent right exists for an insurer to seek subrogated damages in its own
name." Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, 18, 368 P.3d 471. On the contrary, a review of Utah

10
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case law shows that Utah has long recognized that the subrogating insurer is a real party
in interest in a subrogation action and has the right to seek subrogated damages in its own
name.
In 1913, National Union Fire Insurance Co. brought an action against a defendant
railroad company on behalf of its insured. Nat'/ Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R. G.R.
Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 P. 653, 653 (1913). The defendant argued that because National

Union had not reimbursed the insured for the full amount of the damages suffered (the
insured had not been made whole), the insured maintained an interest in the claim and the
claim should have been brought by the insured. Id.. at 654. The Utah Supreme Court
rejected this argument. Id. at 654-57. The supreme court noted that a subrogating insurer
acts as an assignee and thus is a real party in interest with a right to bring an action in its
own name, whether or not there is a formal assignment issued. See id. at 655-56. The
Utah Supreme Court established this insurer as real party in interest rule reasoning that
even if no formal assignment had been issued, an equitable assignment had still arisen.
Id. The Utah Supreme Court explained:
~-

Not only does the [insurer as real party in interest] rule prevail when the
assignment is absolute and complete and the assignee is the legal owner of
the demand; it prevails with equal force in cases where the assignment is
simply equitable in its character; and the assignee's title would not have
been recognized in any form by a court of law under the old system but
would have been purely equitable. Such assig~ee, being the real party in
interest, must bring the action in his own name.

Id. Thus, even if the insurer "only obtained an equitable or·a qualified interest as
contradistinguished from an absolute and unqualified interest, still ... it was the real

11

party in interest~ so far its interest extended, and the action could be commenced and
maintained in its name." Id. at 65 5.
In the 193 8 case Baker v. Wycoff, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted then recent
changes in Utah's worker's compensation statute to determine if a subrogating insurer
has a legal right to maintain a subrogation action. 79 P .2d 77, 80 ( 193 8). The legislation
interpreted in Baker stated that an "insurance carrier having paid the compensation shall
be subrogated to the rights of su·ch employee or his dependents to recover against such

third person." Id. 80-81 (emphasis added). However, the statute did not explain how a
subrogation action should be commenced, nor in whose name the action should be
pursued. See id. The supreme court concluded that, while the injured employee originally
had a valid cause of action, "[a]ny right of action he had [was then] passed, under the
statute, to the insurance carrier, who was by law subrogated to the rights of the
workman." Id. at 81. Thus, the Utah Supreme Court held that a subrogating insurer is the
real party in interest in a subrogation claim with ownership of the claim and a right to
bring the claim in its own name. See id.
The supreme court later revisited this ~ame subrogation statute in Johanson v.
Cudahy Packing Co. to determine whether the insured, along with the subrogating

insurer, is also a real party in interest. 152 P.2d 98 (1944). 2 The supreme court seemed to
agree with the proposition that if the insured has been made whole, the insured "would no
longer have any interest in the cause of action," and the insurer would remain the sole

2

Johanson v. Cu.dahy Packing Co ..will be analyzed in much greater detail below in
Section I(C) of this Brief.
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party in interest. Id. at 103. However, if the insurer has not paid the full amount of the
loss suffered, the injured insured retains an interest in the action. Id. at 104. Under such
circumstances, both the insurer ("as equitable assignees 'of the insured," id. at 104) and
the injured insured are "co-owners of the insured's right of action." Id. at 104.
As the twentieth century progressed, the Utah Supreme Court continually
recognized a subrogating insurer's right to bring a subrogation action in its own name. In
1969, the Supreme Court decided State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange, 450 P.2d 458 (1969). In State Farm, the subrogating insurer
brought a subrogation claim, in its own name, to recover for medical expenses it had paid
on behalf of its insured. See State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 493 P.2d
1002, 1002~03 ( 1972) (providing factual background for the 1969 case). The tortfeasor
argued that under Utah law, insurers could not pursue personal injury subrogation claims.

Id. The supreme court dismissed this argument, allowing insurers to bring personal injury
subrogation claims in the insurer's name. State Farm, 450 P.2d at 459.
In Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Barnes, Transamerica's insured was involved in
a car accident where a passenger in the insured's car was injured. 505 P.2d 783 (Utah
1972). Based on the insurance policy, Transamerica paid monies on behalf of the injured
passenger. Transamerica notified the tortfeasor of its subrogation rights, but the tortfeasor
sought to bypass the insurance company by settling with the injured party. Transamerica
brought a subrogation action in its own name to enforce its subrogation rights. While
Transamerica did not prevail, the Utah Supreme Court did not question whether or not
Transamerica had standing to bring the subrogation action in its own name.
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In Educators Mutual Insurance Association v. Allied Property & Casualty
Insurance Co., Educators Mutual improperly pursued its subrogation rights through a

fraud cause of action. 890 P .2d 1029 (Utah 1995). The Utah Supreme Court affirmed
dismissing Educators Mutual' s case based on fraud, noting that Educators Mutual should
have pursued its rights through a subrogation action, _noting "It is well settled that an
insurer may bring a cause of action on behalf of its insured." Id. at 1031. The Educators
Mutual Court then cited to both State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, 450 P.2d 458 (Utah 1969)-a case where the insurance company brought its

subrogation claim in its own name, not the name of its insured-and Utah Code Ann. §
3 lA-21-108 ("Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its
insured."). Educators Mutual, 890 P .2d at 1031. The Utah Supreme Court did not
indicate that the insurer had run afoul of either the real party in interest rule or standing
rule by bringing the claim in its own name.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Northwestern National
Insurance Co., State Farm brought a subrogation action in its own name to recoup monies

State Farm paid after its insured was involved in an automobile accident. 912 P.2d 983
(Utah 1996). The Utah Supreme Court explained, "Utah law clearly recognizes an
insurer's right to bring a subrogation action on behalf of its insured against a tortfeasor [or
the] insurance company which is primarily liable to ... pay any claims on behalf of its
insured." Id. at 985 (citing Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-21-108). The Utah Supreme Court
never questioned whether State Farm was the real party in interest with standing to bring
the action in its own name.
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Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. involved multiple insurance

companies and the liability of each to defend and pay for environmental clean-up of an
industrial site. 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997). Aetna cross-claimed in its own name against
AMICO and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, seeking subrogation and
contribution for the defense costs it had paid. Id. at 131. Even though "an insurer's
subrogation right is derivative of the rights of its insured," id., the Utah Supreme Court
did not require Aetna to seek subrogation in the name of its insured. Rather, the Court
held that "Aetna has a valid cause of action for ... subrogation." Id. at 142.
Finally, consider the district court matter of AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Adler Hot
Oil Serv. Inc., No. 150800020 (Utah 8th Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 26, 2015). (A copy of the

. docket and complaint for that matter are included as Addend. D). In that matter numerous
insurers sued in their own names when asserting their subrogation rights, clearly showing
that both insurers and the courts have long interpreted Utah law as allowing an insurance
company to bring a subrogation action in either the name of the insurance company or the
name of their insured.
Under Utah law, a subrogating insurer is, and has long been, a real party in interest
in a subrogation claim. As "the real party in interest ... the action could be commenced
and maintained in its name." Nat'! Union, 137 P. at 655. As Utah subrogation law
evolved, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the insured could also be a real party in
interest, or "co-owner" of the claim. See Johanson, 152 P .2d at 104. However, no case or
statute has altered the long-standing rule that a subrogating insurer is a real party in

15

interest in a subrogation claim with the right to bring a subrogation action in its own
name.

C.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED JOHANSON V.
CUDAHY.
The Utah Court of Appeals relies primarily on the 1944 case, Johanson v. Cudahy

Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98 (Utah 1944), to support its proposition that EMIA cannot bring

a subrogation action in its own name. See Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, 118-11, 368 P.3d
471. Specifically, the court of appeals relies on the following language from Johanson:
"'it has been generally held that a suit at law to enforce a right of subrogation must, at
common law, be brought in the name of the insured, rather than by the insurance
company in its own name and right."' Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ~ 10,368 P.3d471
(quoting Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104). This reliance on Johanson is misplaced primarily
because the portion of Johanson quoted by the court of appeals is not the law the
Johanson Court adopted; specifically, the Johanson Court first analyzed the different

positions taken by other states (including the position quoted by the court of appeals)
before adopting the completely contrary position that, under Utah law, both the insurer
and insured are real parties in interest and both may bring the cause of action in their own
name. Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104-105.
Because the Johanson decision is so important to the court of appeal's decision in
this matter, this Brief will address in depth the analysis and holding of Johanson v.
C!J,dahy Packing Company. This Brief will then individually address each instance in .
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which the court of appeals relied on Johanson. Finally, this Brief will show how the
holding of Johanson supports EMIA' s position.
l. Analysis and Holding of Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co.
Johanson is a demurrer case in which the court was required to determine the

parties' rights to bring a wrongful death cause of action in accordance with Utah's 1933
worker's compensation subrogation statute. Already established and accepted by the
Johanson Court was the Utah rule that the subrogating insurer is a real party in interest

with right to bring the claim in its own name. Id. at 100, 103-05. The primary question
before the Johanson Court was whether the subrogating insurer is the sole party in
interest or if the injured insured also retained a right to the claim and was also a party in
interest. Id.
The factual background to Johanson is as follows. Robert Jchanson died in an
industrial accident in 1938. Id. at 100. His parents applied for and were awarded
industrial compensation for the death of their son in accordance with Utah's worker's
compensation statute. Id. While the insurance carrier who paid the award could have
brought a subrogation action against defendants in its own name, the insurer waived its
right to bring the action. Id. at 104. Johanson's parents then brought a wrongful death
cause of action themselves in their own names. Id. The defendant tortfeasor argued that,
because the parents received a compensation award from the insurer, the insurer was the
sole party in interest and the J chansons "are not the proper parties to bring this action."
Id. at 102. Defendants argued that only the subrogating insurer who had paid the award

could bring the claim. Id.
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At the time of the Johanson decision, there were three primary views the different
states had adopted concerning in whose name a subrogation action should be brought. See
Michael C. Ferguson, The Real Party in Interest Rule Revitalized: Recognizing
Defendant's Interest in the Determination ofProper Parties Plaintiff, 55 CAL. L. REV.

1452, 1479-80 ( 1967), http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
2841 &context=califomialawreview. The first view was that "actions on subrogated
claims must be prosecuted by the subrogee [insurer] alone." Id. The second view was that
"such actions [must] be prosecuted by the subrogor [insured] alone." Id. at 1480. The
final view was that "either the subrogor or the subrogee [may] prosecute such actions."
Id. In analyzing the issue of whether or not an injured insured is a real party in interest,

the Johanson Court reviewed other jurisdictions' rulings to see how other states had
addressed this issue, Johanson, 152 P.2d at 102-05, and the Johanson Court examined all
three of the above views. Id.
The first view, that the subrogee/insurer alone was the real party in interest, was
embraced by Justice McDonough in the dissenting opinion. Id. at 110-111 (J.
McDonough, dissenting). Justice McDonough opined that an insurer's subrogation rights
result in "giving control of the cause of action [to the] insurance carrier. It results in the
... insurance carrier becoming the real party in interest .... The election by the
employee [to accept compensation from the insurer] divests him of any legal interest in
the cause of action." Id. at 110 (J. McDonough, dissenting). The Johanson Court did not
adopt this view.

18

@

The second view, that the subrogor/insured was the sole party in interest, was
analyzed but not adopted in the majority opinion. Id. at 103-04. The Johanson Court
noted that cases from several states support this rule. Id. at 103.
These cases proceed upon the theory that the insured is the trustee for the
insurer and that the ·third party has a right not to have the cause of action
against him split up so that he is compelled to defend two or more actions.
This splitting of the cause of action is avoided by having the suit brought in
the name of the insured for the benefit of himself and as trustee for the
.
.
msurance earner.
Id. at 103-04. Under this rule, the Johanson Court noted "it has been generally held that a
suit at law to enforce such right of subrogation must, at common law, be brought in the
name of the insured, rather than by the insurance company in its own name and right." Id.
at 104. While this view was contrary to Utah's precedence (that a subrogating insurer is
the real party in interest in a subrogation claim, see Baker v. Wycoff, 79 P.2d 77, 81 (Utah
1938); Nat'l Union, 137 P. at 655), analysis of this view supported the Johanson Court's
final holding that the insured should maintain at least some rights to the cause of action.
The view adopted by the Johanson Court was that both the subrogor and the
subrogee are real parties in interest. Johanson, P.2d at 105. This view was analyzed at
Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104-105. The Johanson Court began this line of analysis stating,
."There are cases holding that under statutes similar to Utah statutes relating to proper and
/~

necessary parties plaintiff both the insured and the insurance carrier must be joined." Id
at 104. In support of this view, the Johanson Court stated, "insurers which, by
subrogation, are equitable assignees ... not only are proper parties plaintiff, but must be
joined as such." Id. at 104 (quoting 96 A.L.R. 884-89). Under the view adopted by the
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Johanson Court, both the insured and insurer were "co-owners of the insured' s right of

action." Id. at 104.
In applying this view to the facts of the case, the Johanson Court held, "When the
insurance carrier declined to bring its action and executed a waiver thereof, the
dependents were not compelled to forego suit. They have an interest in the recovery and
can bring suit to enforce it." Id. at 104. The supreme court continued, "The failure on the
part of the plaintiffs to make the [missing party] a party plaintiff, or if it refused to join,
make it a party defendant, is at the most a defect in parties plaintiff. Such a defect is
waived unless raised." Id. at 104-05. The rule adopted by the Johanson Court is that both
the insurer and insured are real parties in interest. Id. Both parties should be joined as
parties plaintiff. Id. If one of the parties is not joined, "the defendant, by making timely
objection, could have had the [missing party] made a party." Id. at 107. Failure to join the
missing party is a defect that, unless raised, is waived. Id. at 104-05.
2. The Court of Appeals Misapplied Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co.
The court of appeals misapplied.the ruling in Johanson. It took one view analyzed
by the Johanson Court and incorrectly applied that view as Utah law. This mistake is
completely at odds with the actual holding in Johanson, is inconsistent with the
development of Utah's subrogation law prior to Johanson, and ignores the development
of subrogation case law subsequent to Johanson. See, e.g., Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997) (allowing insurer to bring subrogation claim

in own name); State Farm Mut._Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat~ Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983 (Uta4
1996) (same); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783 (Utah 1972) (same); State
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Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 450 P.2d 458 (Utah 1969) (same); Nat'!
Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 377 P.2d 786 (Utah 1963)
(same).
The court of appeals' primary application of Johanson was to cite Johanson's
analysis of the subrogor/insured as sole party in interest view, a view not adopted by the

Johanson Court. Under this rejected view, '"it has been generally held that a suit at law to
enforce a right of subrogation must, at common law, be brought in the name of the
insured, rather than by the insurance company in its own name and right."' Wilson, 2016
UT App 38, ,r 10, 368 P.3d 471 (quoting Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104). However, the

Johanson Court rejected this view. Instead, the Johanson Court adopted the view that
both the insurer and insured are real parties in interest, both are co-owners of the claim,
and both may bring the action in their own name. Johanson, 152 P .2d at 104-105.
The court of appeals cited Johanson for the policy concern that allowing "an
insurer to sue in its own name, except where it has fully indemnified the insured, could
compel the wrongdoer to 'defend a multitude of suits' against multiple insurance
companies, the insured, and/or the insured's dependents or heirs." Wilson, 2016 UT App
38, ,r,r 10, 12 n.6, 368 P.3d 471 (citing Johanson, 152 P.2d at 103). However, the

Johanson Court addressed how this concern is resolved under the rule adopted by Utah.
Specifically, the Johanson Court concluded ~hat under the Utah rule (both insured and
insurer are real parties in interest), the multiple suits problem is solved through joinder.
There is but a single cause of action involved .... That the in~urers as
equitable assignees of the insured are interested therein to the extent of their
payment to the insured ... does not create other causes of action, legal or
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equitable, against defendants. It is still one cause of action, a single
controversy, owned in common by the insured and the insur~rs .... The
plaintiffs herein, co-owners of the insured's right of action, were not only
authorized by the state law to sue jointly as they did, but were compelled to
do so. One compelled to join and joined in an action, and having a
substantial interest therin, is not a nominal, but a necessary or indispensable
party.

Id. at 104. The supreme court explained how joinder protects a defendant against multiple
suits. "The one and only interest of [defendant] is that the suit be brought in the names of
those interested in it so that he will not later be made to defend a second suit for the same
wrong." Id. at 107. The supreme court explained that this "protection [against multiple
suits] is insured here by the fact that the defendant, by making timely objection, could
have had the [missing party] made a party." Id. at 107. Should the missing party.not be
joined, that "is at the most a defect in parties plaintiff. Such a defect is waived unless
raised." Id. at 105. The multiple suits problem highlighted by the court of appeals is
solved, under Utah law, throughjoinder.
Finally, the court of appeals notes that in workers' compensation cases such as
Johanson, the legislature has granted explicit rights to the subrogating insurer, including

"expressly grant[ing] insurers ... the authority to bring such actions in their own names,"
Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ,r 8 n.4, 368 P.3d 471, and "expressly provid[ing] that the

insurer is to be reimbursed before the employee or the employee's heirs." Id. ,I 11 n.5.
While both of these rights do appear in· current day statutes, neither right was expressly
granted in the 1933 version of the statute interpreted by the Johanson Court. Rather, the
Johanson Court relied on "general principles of subrogation as affected by statutes
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governing pleading"-rather than express statutory language-in holding that both the
insurer and insured are real parties in inter~st. Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104 ("when ... no
special rules for maintaining the [subrogation] action are prescribed, the proceeding to
enforce the rights gained by subrogation will be controlled by general principles of
subrogation as affected by statutes governing pleading.").
3. The Holding of Johanson Supports EMIA's Position.
Under Johanson's holding, both EMIA and Jessica Wilson (or Ms. Wilson's
estate) are real parties in interest in this suit. Either may maintain the action in their own
name. To protect himself from multiple sui!s, the defendant could have had Ms. Wilson's
estate made a party to the proceedings. However, no party sought to have Ms. Wilson's
estate joined in these proceedings. Failure to join Ms. Wilson's estate "is at the most a
defect in parties plaintiff. Such a defect is waived unless raised." Johanson, 152 P.2d at
105. It is important to note that the parties at the trial court level did consolidate the
wrongful death proceeding with the subrogation proceeding. As such, consolidation
provided the defendant with protection from multiple suits in this matter.
The court of appeals misapplied Johanson by relying on language that the
Johanson Court did not adopt as Utah law. The actual holding of Johanson, that both the
insurer and insured are real parties in interest and both may bring the cause of action in
their own name, Johanson; 152 P.2d at 104-105, supports El\.1IA's position. EJ\.1IA is a
real party in interest and may maintain a subrogation action in its own name.
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D.

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS CREATED A REQUIREMENT THAT
WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR AN INSURER TO RECOVER IN
INSTANCES WHERE AN INSURED PASSES AW AY FROM THE
ACTIONS OR INACTIONS OF A TORTFEASOR.
Near the conclusion of its opinion, the court of appeals stated, "EMIA should have

qrought its personal injury_ action in the name of the estate .... " Wilson, 2016 UT App
38, ,r 12,368 P.3d 471. However, such a requirement ignores§ 31A-21-108 and Utah
case law which allows an insurer to bring a subrogation action in its own name, and is
untenable for two reasons. First, it creates a situation where an insurer would have to
initiate a probate proceeding and hope for the assistance of a personal representative who
would likely be unwilling to aid the insurer in its efforts to receive reimbursement; and
second, the requirement runs contrary to rules of statutory interpretation.
First, by requiring an insurer to bring an action in the name of the estate of its
insured, the court of appeals has created a situation where an insurer will likely never be
able to recover if its insured passes away as a result of injuries sustained by the actions or
inactions of a third party. Utah code states in regard to survival actions
A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a person, or death caused
by the wrongful act or negligence of a wrongdoer, does not abate upon the
death of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person, or the
personal representatives or heirs of the person who died, has a cause of
action against the wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the
wrongdoer.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107 (emphasis added). Given the lat1:guage of§ 78B-3-107,
which only allows a survival action to be brought by the injured person, personal
representative, or heirs of the deceased, and the court of appeals' reasoning, an insurer
would be required to initiate a probate proceeding and pursue its claims with the
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assistance of a personal representative who would likely be a family member of the
deceased. If the present matter illustrates anything it is that the interests of the family of a
deceased individual and that of the insurer are often conflicted. A personal representative
or family member would have little incentive to assist an insurer if doing so would
potentially reduce the amount of assets or funds available for the person acting as
personal representative, or other family members, to receive. Creating such a requirement
was unnecessary given § 3 lA-21-108 allows an insurer to bring a subrogation action in
its own name.
Second, requiring an insurer to sue in the name of the estate of its insured runs
contrary to normal rules of statutory interpretation. The Utah Supreme Court has stated in
regard to statutory interpretation, there is a "general rule that [the court] should construe
statutory provisions so as to give full effect to all their terms, where possible." Schurtz v.

BMW ofNorth America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991). Further, "[w]hen
interpreting statutes, we look first to the statute's plain language with the primary
objective of giving effect to the legislature's intent." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus,
2007 UT 42, ,r 46, 164 P.3d 384. Also, "'[w]e presume that the legislature used each
word advisedly' and read 'each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.'"

Id. (quoting State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ,r 29, 127 P.3d 682). Finally, "[s]tatutes should
be read as a whole and their provisions interpreted in harmony with related provisions
and statutes." Martinez, 2007 UT 42,

,r 46, 164 P.3d 384. The approach utilized by the

court of appeals ignores Utah Code Ann. § 3 lA-21-108, and allows § 78B-3-l 07 to
nullify, or swallow,§ 3 lA-21-108. Such an approach runs contrary to the requirement
25

that"[ s]tatutes should be read as a whole and their provisions interpreted in harmony
with related provisions and statutes." Martinez, 2007 UT 42, ,r 46, 164 P.3d 384.
Another approach, which would have given full effect to§ 3 lA-21-108 and§ 78B-3-1O7,
would have been to allow an insurer to recover those damages pertaining to its
subrogation claim, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-21-108, while allowing heirs to
recover those damages available pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-107, as the
damages that each respective party would be entitled to differ.

E.

THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED POLICY IMPLICATIONS.
The court of appeals has also failed to consider serious policy implications. First,

as was noted above, it is unlikely insurers will receive reimbursement if an insured passes
away because of the actions or inactions of a third-party tortfeasor if an insurer cannot
bring a subrogation action in its own name. In order to protect their interests, insurers will
likely add language to their policies excluding coverage for injuries sustained by an
insured that were caused by a third-party, if the insured subsequently passes away as a
result of the injuries sustained. This would inappropriately shift the financial burden from
the tortfeasor to the family of the insured and/or medical providers. Simply put, the Utah
Court of Appeals' opinion disincentivizes insurers providing coverage for most
catastrophic accidents.
Second, even if insurers do not add exclusionary language to their policies, it is
likely that insurance premiums will increase substantially. When actuaries for insurance
companies determine premiums for insurance policies they generally take into account
the right of the insurer to subrogate against a tortfeasor who has caused the injuries of its
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insured. If an insurer is effectively barred from maintaining a ·subrogation action because
the insured has died as a result of the injuries sustained, premium rates would increase
since there would be no hope for reimbursement. This is unfair to insureds who would be
forced to bear the burden of increased premiums.
Finally, there are instances where it makes good sense procedurally to allow
insurers to ·bring subrogation actions in their own names. This is especially true in multiparty actions. In those cases there may be multiple insurers seeking subrogation, and
Plaintiffs seeking redress for tort claims. All of the parties would potentially be suing
under the same name. For example, in matters like AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Adler Hot

Oil Serv. Inc., No. 150800020 (Utah 8th Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 26, 2015), where there are
several parties involved, forcing the insurers to sue in the names of their insureds creates
confusion and an organizational nightmare for the district court. All of which is avoided
by simply allowing insurers to bring their subrogation actions in their _own names.

F.

HILL AND CEDERLOFFDO NOT STAND FOR THE PROPOSITION
THAT AN HEIR HAS A SUPERIOR RIGHT TO RECOVER IN A
PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM.
In footnote 6 of its opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals states
EMIA asserts that the correct approach would be to allow the insurer and
the heirs to pursue separate claims to recover their respective shares of
damages arising from a personal injury claim. Such an approach would ...
potentially compromise the heirs' superior right to recover their share of
the personal injury claim, see Hill [v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765
P.2d 864, 866 (Utah 1988)]. See Cederlojf v. Whited, 169 P.2d 777, 780
(Utah 1946).

Wilson, 2016 UT App 38,, 12 n.6, 368 P.3d 471 (emphasis added). However, neither
Hill nor Ceder/off stand for the proposition that heirs have a superior right of recovery.
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The portion of Hill cited to by the Utah Court of Appeals provides a factual
background; the general principle that "Subrogation is an equitable doctrine .... [which]
can be modified by contract"; and the obstacles associated with determining whether or
not an insured has been made whole by a settlement when equitable subrogation
principles apply rather than contractual principles. 765 P.2d at 866. 3 Hill simply does not
state that heirs have a superior right to recovery.
In regard to Ceder/off, that matter did not deal with wrongful death heirs, nor did it
address the issue of priority of recovery between heirs and a subrogated insurer. Instead,
the Utah Supreme Court considered whether or not an insured who had received
insurance proceeds could maintain an action in the insured' s name for amounts that had
been paid by the insurer in behalf of the insured. Ceder/off, 169 P.2d at 777-78.
Therefore, similar to Hill, Cederloff does not stand for the proposition that heirs have a
superior right to recovery over an insurer.

II.

THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED RULE 17 OF THE UT AH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE INCORRECTLY.
Even if the Utah Court of Appeals correctly interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 3 lA. .

.

21-108, it misapplied Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule. 17 states

No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed
after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder
or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or

3

It should be noted that EMJA was subrogating iri accordance with the contractual terms
contained in its insurance policy with Jessica Wilson. As such, much of the doctrine
contained in Hill is inapplicable as the Hill Court applied equitable principles of
subrogation in that matter. _See Hill, 765 P.2d at 867.
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substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced
in the name of the real party in interest.
U.R.C.P. 17(a). (emphasis added).
Despite the clear language in Rule 17, in its opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals
stated, "We conclude that El\1IA lacked standing to pursue a subrogation action against
Krueger in its own name. Thus, the trial court err~d in dividing the Wilsons' settlement
with EWA. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand with instructions
for the trial court to dismiss EMIA 's claims . ... " Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ,r 13, 368

P.3d 471. (emphasis added). EMIA's ability to bring a subrogation action in its own
name is not a standing issue, rather a real party in interest issue governed by Rule 17,
making dismissal inappropriate. While El\1IA believes that it was proper to bring its
subrogation action in its own name, even if it could not, EMIA would have had standing
had it brought its subrogation action in the name of its insured. See Wilson, 2016 UT App
38, ,r 12, 368 P.3d 471 ("EMIA should have brought its personal injury action in the
name of the estate or intervened in the Wilsons' action against Krueger."). Therefore,
pursuant to Rule 17, the Utah Court of Appeals should not have ordered that EMIA's
claims be dismissed.
The problem with this remedy is illustrated in A GCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Adler Hot
Oil Serv. Inc., No. 150800020 (Utah 8th Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 26, 2015). In that matter

several insurers sued in their own names when asserting their subrogation rights. Shortly
after the Wilson opinion was entered, the insurers in that matter immediately filed
motions to change the named party in interest to their insureds. However, the holding of
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Wilson may not allow for that change, but may require dismissal of the subrogating
insurers' actions. Such a result is unfair and inappropriate pursuant to Rule 17.
Because EMIA' s ability to bring a subrogation action in its own name is not a
standing issue, rather a real party in interest i_ssue governed by Rule 17, dismissal was
inappropriate.

CONCLUSION
Because EMIA had standing to bring its action in its own name, the decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals should be reversed. Further, even if§ 3 lA-21-108 does not give
EMIA standing to bring an action in its own name, the court of appeals' decision
requiring the trial court to dismiss EMIA' s action should be reversed as it is contrary to
Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

EVERETTP. WTI..SONJR. AND DARLA WILSON,

Appellants,
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No. 20150150-CA
Filed February 25, 2016
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Samuel D. McVey
No. 110400083
Jack C. Helgesen and Craig Helgesen, Attorneys
for Appellants
Randall R. Smart and Jeffrey A. Callister, Attorneys
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SENlOR JUDGE p AMELA T. GREENWOOD

authored this Opinion, in
which JlJDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN and KATE A. TOOMEY
concurred. 1

GREENWOOD, Senior Judge:

<j[l
Everett P. Wilson Jr. and Darla Wilson appeal the trial
court's order awarding a portion of interpleaded funds to
Educators Mutual Insurance Association (EMIA). We reverse
and remand.

1. Senior Judge Pamela T. Greenwood sat by special assignment

·as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Ad.min. 11~
201(6).

~

i '

!

Wilson v. Educators Mutual Insurance

BACKGROUND
<][2
On September 19, 2010, the Wilsons' daughter, Jessica,
was killed after having been struck by a vehicle drivert by Cade
Krueger. EMIA, Jessica's insurer, paid nearly $79,000 in medical
expenses on her behalf. No personal representative was sought
or appointed for Jessica's estate.
<j{3

The Wilsons filed a wrongful death claim against Krueger

on January 12, 2011, seeking damages for the loss, love, and
affection of their daughter and for funeral expenses. After
several years of discovery and litigation, the Wilsons reached a
tentative settlement with Krueger's insurer for the $100,000 limit
on his insurance po~cy.
On January 22, 2014, EMIA filed a II Complaint for
Subrogation Claim" against Kruege!, seeking reimbursement for
medical expenses it had paid on Jessica's behalf, with accrued
interest. 2 EWA asserted its subrogation claim pursuant to the
terms of its insurance contract with Jessica. All par!ies agreed to_
consolidate the cases, and Krueger filed an interpleader
counterclaim against both the Wilsons and EMIA, in which his
insurer agre_ed to interplead the $100,000 policy limit with the
court. EMIA and the Wilsons agreed to accept ·the $100,000 in
settlement of their clanns against Krueger but disagreed as to
how the funds should be distributed. EMIA and the Wilsons
agreed to dismiss Krueger from the lawsuit with prejudice. The
trial court ordered Krueger's insurer to deposit the $100,000 with
the court and gave the parties the opporhmity to file briefs in
support of their competing claims to the funds.
<JI4

2. EMIA had initially asserted a lien agamst the Wilsons'
wrongful death claim but later acknowledged that it could not
assert such a lien u against payments to the heirs of a deceased on
a wrongful death claim."

. 20150150-CA
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1[5
The Wilsons asserted that they were entitled to the entire
· $100,000 settlement. They raised a number of arguments in
support of this position, including that they have "superior
equity" over a subrogated insurer and are therefore entitled to
be "made whole'~ before the insurer is paid, tJ::tat EMIA had no
legal right to pursue a cause of action against Krueger in its own
name, and that EMIA' s action was barred by a three-year statute
of limitations.
1[6
The trial court ultimately rejected the Wilsons' arguments
and divided the settlement money equally between the Wilsons
and EMIA after finding that each party had incurred damages in
excess of $100,000. However, in acknowledgment that the
Wilsons' efforts to obtain the settlement had been
disproportionate to those of EMIA, the trial court determined
that the Wilsons were entitled to $25,817.69 of EMIA' s award to
reimburse them for· a portion of their attorney fees. Accordingly,
the trial court awarded $75,817.69 to the Wilsons and $24,182.31
to EMIA~ The Wilsons now appeal.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

•,:.::1

1[7
The Wilsons ~aise a number of arg:t,nnf:nts in support of
their assertion that the trial court erred in awarding EMIA a
portion of the settlement. Because we agree with the Wilsons
that EMIA lacked standing to bring a subrogation action in its
own name rather than in the name of Jessica or Jessica's estate,
we do not address the Wilsons' other arguments. As this
question involves the interpretation of a statute, as well as
decisional precedents, we review the trial court's ruling for
correctness. See MacFarlane v. Utah State Tax Comm_'n, 2006 UT 25.,
i 9, 134 P.3d 1116 (" A matter of statutory interpretation [is] a
question of_ law that we review on appeal for correctness."
(alteration in original) (citation ~d internal quotation marks
omitted)); In re Adoption of A.F.K., 2009 UT App 198, 1[· 16, 216
P.3d 980 (explaining that "issues that require interpretation of

20150150-CA
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prior. decisional precedents" are "questions of law that are
reviewed for correctness" (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).

ANALYSIS

18

Utah's ~ubrogation statute provides, "Subrogation actions
may be brought by the insurer in the name of its insured." Utah
Code Ann.§ 31A-21-108 (LexisNexis 2014). EMIA asserts that the
use of the word "may" impli~s that the insurer may bring the
action in the name of the insured but is not required to do so and
may instead choose to bring the action in its own name. See State
v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("[T]he term
'may' is generally construed to be permissive and not mandatory
. . . ." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We
assume, without deciding, that the statute's use of the
permissive ,,.may" allows for the possibility that bringing an
action in the name of the insured is not the exclusive manner for ·
an insurer to pursue a subrogation claim. 3 Nevertheless, the

3. Though we assume for purposes of our analysis that the
permissive "may" applies to the manner in which the insurer
brings the action, i.e., in its own n~e ?r in the name of another,

we recognize that the legi~lature may have int~nded the word
"may" to grant the insurer discretion only as to whether to bring
the action at all. Cf Thorpe v. Washington City, 2.010 ~ App 297,
<_[<JI 23-24, 243 P.3d 500 (rejecting the assertion that language
providing t~at "[a] final action or order of [a municipal
employee] appeal board may be· appealed to the Court of
Appeals" could be interpreted as permitting a party to appeal in ·
another venue,. explaining that the l~guage "is not permissive
in .the sense that the employee may seek review in the court of
appeals if he likes but may complain in some other judicial
venue if he prefers'' but that, "[o]n the contrary, the statute is
(continued ... )

20150150-CA

4

2016 UT App 38

Wilson v. Educators Mutual Insurance

statute contains no language granting an insurance company the
right to bring a subrogation action in its own name. 4 So even
assuming that bringing an action ~ the name of the insured is
110'£, statutorily, the exclusive method for· bringing suit, there
must be some legal basis, apart from the statute as currently
written, authorizing the insurer to bring_ the action in its own
name. Cf Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525, 528 (Utah 1976)
(provi~g that permissive language in a statute "does not
foreclose the right of a person" to pursue a remedy "'by any
other means provided by law" (emphasis added)). Our review of
Utah case law convinces us that, with the possible exception o(
an insurer who has fully· indemnified the · insured for all
damages for which the wrongdoer could be held liable, see
Johanson v. Cudahy [!acking Co., 152 P .2d 98, 103 (Utah 1944), no

( ... continued)
clear that the only court to which the employee may seek initial
recourse . . . is the Utah Court of Appeals" (first alteration in
original)) ...
4. Conversely, the legislature has expressly granted insurers
seeking re:imbursement for the payment of workers'
compensation benefits the authority to bring such actions in their
own names:
If compensation is claimed and the employer or
.insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay
compensation, the employer or insurance carrier:
(i) shall become trustee of the cause of action
against the third party; and
(ii) may bring and maintain the action either in its
own name or .in. the name of the injured employee,
or the employee's heirs or the personal
representative of the deceased.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(2)(a) ·(LexisNexis 2011) (emphasis
added).

20150150-CA
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independent right exists for an insurer to seek subrogated
damages~ its own name.
<_[9

First, E1vllA does not have a direct cause of action against

Krueger. "An insurer's subrogation right to recover from a
responsible third party the amount the insurer paid to or on
behalf of its insured derives from the insurance contract between
the insurer and the insured," and its causes of action against that
third party are limited "to those rights or causes of action that
the insured possesses against the third party." Bakowski v.
Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, 'II 23, 52 P.3d 1179. "[E]ven
though the insurance company is subrogated to a part of the
claim of the plaintiff, against the defendant, that does not create
another cause of action and there can only be one suit to recover
on that cause of action." Cederloff v. Whited, 169 P.2d 777, 780
(Utah 1946).
110 Further, "it has been generally held that a suit at law to
enforce [a] right of subrogation must, at common law, be
brought in the name of the insured, rather than_ by the insurance
company in its own name and right." Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Utah R.
Civ. P. 17(a) ("Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest. ... [A] party authorized by statute may
sue in that person's name .... "). "The reason for the rule is that
the wrongful act'' of the third party being sued "is single and
:indivisible, and gives r_ise to but one liability." Johanson, 152 P.2d
at 103. Permitting an insurer to sue in its own name, except
where it has fully :indemnified the insured, could compel the
wrongdoer to "defend a multitude of suits" against multiple
insurance · companies, the insured, and/or the insmed's
dependents or heirs. Id.

111

Furthermore, "[ c]onsiderations of reason and :policy impel
the conclusion that the plaintiff, the o~e who has s~fered the
injury and damage, should have basic ownership ~d co~trol of
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his cause of action.'' Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1973).
Even under statutory schemes that give the insurance carrier's
right to reimbursement priority over the injured party's right to
damages, 5 our supreme court has concluded "that the rights
conferred upon the insurance carrier" to pursue an action
against a third .party "should be regarded as secondary to the
plaintiff's interest" in controlling the cause of action. Id. Thus, at
least where the insured or the insured' s estate retains some
interest in the potential damages, an insurance company cannot
pursue a subrogation action in its own name.
<J[l2 After Jessica's death, her cause of action for personal
injury passed to her estate by· virtue of Utah's survival statute.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107(1)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015)
(" A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a person, or
death caused by the wrongful act or negligence of a wrongdoer,
does not abate upon the death of the ... injured person.... [T]he
personal representatives or heirs of the person who died, .. [have]
a cause of action against the wrongdoer . . . .").. The survival
statute grants the personal representatives or heirs of the injured
decedent the right to pursue both "special and general damages"

5. In subrogation actions where the insurer has paid workers'
compensation benefits, such as in Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
152 P.2d 98 (Utah 1944), and Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah
1973), the Workers' Compensation Act expressly provides that
the insurer is to be reimbursed before the employee or the
employee's heirs. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5); see also
Anderson v. United Parcel Serv., 2004 UT 57, 11 8-13, 96 P.3d 903.
But in a case such as this, where the expenses paid by the insurer
were not connected to a work~rs' compensation claim, "in the
abser:,.ce of express terms to ~e contrary, the insured must be
made whole before the insurer is entitled to be reimbursed from
a recovery from the third-party tort-feasor." Hill v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P .2d 864, 866 (Utah 1988).
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· against the wrongdoer. Id. General damages include damages
for the insured's pain and suffering, Balderas v. Starks, 2006 UT
App 218,, 116 n.S, 138 P.3d 75, which would have been separate
from the medical expenses paid by E:tv1IA on Jessica's behalf.
Since Je~sica's estate would presumably have b~en entitled to at
least some · portion of the damages recoverable in a personal
injury action, EMIA should have brought its personal injury
action in the name of the estate or mtervened in the Wilsons'
action against Krueger. 6 Instead, it filed an action in its own
name, which Utah law does not permit. Because EMIA lacked
standing to pursue a claim against Krueger in its own name, the
trial court erred in awarding EMIA a portion of the interpleaded
funds.

CONCLUSION
<Jl13 We conclude that EMIA lacked standing to pursue a
subrogation action against Krueger in its own name. Thus, the ·
trial court erred in dividing the Wilsons1 settlement with EMIA.
Acsordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand with
instructions for the trial court to dismiss EMIA' s claims and
award all of the interpleaded funds to the Wilsons.

6. EMIA asserts that the correct approach would be to allow the
insurer and the heirs to pursue separate claims to recover their
respective shares of damages arising from a personal injury
claim. Such an approach --w:ould unnecessarily . subject the
defendant to multiple suits for the same conduct, see Johanson,
152 P.2d at 103, and potentially compromise the heirs' superior
right to recover their share of the personal injury claim,· see Hill,
765 P.2d at 866. See Cederloff v. Whited, 169 P.2d 777, 780 (Utah
1946).
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Randall R. Smart (2983)
Jeffrey A. Callister (9962) ·
Smart, Schofield, Shorter & Lunceford
A Professional Corporation
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 747-0647
Facsimile: (801) 747-1049
r.smart@utahlaw-smart.com
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AttQmeys for Plaintiff Educators Mutual Insurance Association

DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
UTAH COUNTY - PROVO DEP ARTIVIENT

EVERETT P. WILSON JR., DARLA
WILSON, AND INGE VALDMANN

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER REGARDING ALLOCATION OF

and

THE COURT a.r"'d Ortler o.P
Modified by the Court as U~derlined

EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION
Plaintiff(s)

INTERPLEADER AMOUNT DEPOSITED WITH

~so I\. da.--h'on

\'104 00\\ \
Case Number 110400083
Judge Samuel D. McVey

vs.

CADE M. KRUEGER
Defendant(s)

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on January 27, 2015, Judge Samuel D.
Mc Vey presiding. Plaintiffs Evere.tt P. Wilson, Jr. and Darla Wilson (Everett P, Wilson, Jr. and
Darla Wilson are referred to collectively as the "Wilsons,, where appropriate) were present and
represented by counsel, Jaq}c C. Helgesen of Helgesen, Houtz & Jones, P.C, Plaintiff Educators
Mutual Insurance Association· ("EMIA") was represented by counsel, Jeffrey A. Callister of Smart,
Schofield, Shorter· & L~nceford, a professional corporation. The Court, after reviewing EMIA's
F·ebruary 06 1 2015 09:30 AM
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••
Brief Regarding Allocation of Interple-ader Amount Deposited with the Court, Response to Brief on
Interpleaded Funi;ls; the Wilsons' Motion for Summary Judgment, Brief on Allocation I~terpleaded
Funds and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Opposition to Educators
Mutual Insurance Association's Brief Regarding Allocation of Interpleader Amount, and Reply
Memorandum in Support o~ Motion for Summary Judgment, and after hearing oral argu.ment and
otherwise being fully advised, enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order:

•

·FINDINGS OF FACT

1. EMIA and the Wilsons filed separate claims against the Defendant, Cade M. Krueger
("Defendant"), based on losses suffered from the death of Jessica Wilson when Defendant struck

•

her with his vehicle.
2. Jessica Wilson later died from the injuries she incurred.

3. EMTA was the medical insurer of Jessica Wilson_at all times relevant t~ this ma~er.
4. The Wilsons are the parents of Jessica Wilson.
5. EMIA sued Defendant for reimbursement of the medical expenses it paid in behalf of
Jessica Wilson that were incurred when Defendant's vehicle struck her.
6. The Wilsons sued Defendant for the wrongful death of Jessica Wilson.
7. This Court ruled previously that the Wilsons' and E!vfIA's suits against Defendant should
be consolidated.
8. 'Defendant, through his insurer has interplead the policy limit of $100;000.00 with this

Court.
9. EMIA and the Wilsons have dismissed Defendant from the lawsuit with prejudice.
10. The Wilsons have suffered damages for the loss, love and affection of their daughter, and

Fe!:!ruary 06, 2015 09:30 AM
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funeral expenses, which exceed the $100,000.00 deposited with this Court.
11, The amount of damages claimed by EMIA for the medical expenses paid in behalf of
Jessica Wilson also exceed $100,000.00. ·
12. The $100,000.00 deposited with this Court is insufficient to satisfy the damages claimed
by the Wilsons and EMIA. .

•

13. EMIA received premiums for providing medical coverage to Jessica Wilson, however,
those premiums do not equal the amount paid by EMIA for Jessica Wilson's medical expenses.
· 14. The Wilsons have labored more than EMIA to acquire the $100,000.00 that was
deposited with this Court by Defendant.

15. EMIA sued the Defendant later than the Wilsons.
16. The Wilsons have paid $33,334.00 in attorneys' fees and $18,30 1.38 in litigation costs.
17. EMIA has also incurred attorney's fees and costs associated with their action against
Defendant.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Consolidation

_l. EMIA' s action against Defend~nt and the Wilsons' action against Defendant should be
consolidated.
Allocation of the $100.000.00
2. Interpleader actions filed pursuant to Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are
equitable in nature.
3: Where the parties' claims to the $100,000.00 interplead with the Court exceed that

F.ebruary 06, 2015- 09:30 AM
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amount, this Court must balance the equities and determine how that amount should be allocated.
4. The equities that should be balanced in this matter are the Wilsons' loss of their daughter
and EMIA' s claim for reimbursement fo r the medical expenses it paid out in behalf of Jessica
Wilson.

5. EMJA's action is l;>ased in contract, not tort.
6. EMIA's contractual claim survives the death of Jessica Wilson.
7. It is equitable to divide the $100,000.00 equally between the pa1ties, specifically,
$50,000.00 to the Wilsons and $50,000.00 to EMIA.
8. It is equitable .to reimburse the Wilsons for one half of their attorneys' fees and costs from

EMIA's portion. Specifi cally, the Wilsons should be reimbursed $16,667.00 in attorneys ' fees and
$9,150.69 in costs from EMIA's portion.
9. As a result, the Wilsons should receive $75,817 .69 as their final portion of the·
$ 100,000,00 and EMIA should receive $24,1 82.3 1 as its final portion of the $ 100,000.00,

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED. AND DECREED that:
1. Case No._ 1404001 11 is consolidated with case no. 110400083.
2. The Wilsons shalJ ·receive $75,8 17.69 of the $ 100,000.00 deposited with this qourt and

s~id amount shall be released immediately to the Wilsons.
3. EMIA shall receive $24,182 .31 of the $100,000,00 deposited with· this Court and said

amount shall be released immediately to EMIA,
4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to pay out the above sums as stated.

February Q6, 2015 09;30 AM
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aPPROVED AS TO fORM

Isl Jack C. Helgesen with permission
Jack C. Helgesen
Attorney for Plaintiffs Everett and Darla Wilson
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I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of February, 2015, I caused a true and com~ct copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order regarding Allocation of Interpleader
Amount Deposited with the Court to be served on each of the following people:
Person's Name.and Address

Method of Service

Jeffrey C. Miner
Stephen F. Edwards
Morgan, Minn.eek & James, L.C.
Keams Building, Eighth.Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Court E-Filing Notification

Jack C. Helgesen
Tonya Hardy
Helgesen Houtz & Jqnes, P.C.
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Clerk, Fourth District Court
Utah County, Provo Department
125 North 100 West
Provo UT 84601

Electronic Filing
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Secretary
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Randall R. Smart (298 3)
Jeffrey A. Callister (99 62)

SMART, SCHOFIELD, SHORTER & LUNCEFORD
A Professional Corporation
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200
Mun-ay > Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 747-0647
Facsimile: (801) 747-1049
r. sma rt@.u tahl aw-smart. com
jeff.callisterr@utahlaw-smart.com
Attomeys for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
UTAH COUNTY-PROVO DEPARTMENT
ORDER

EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION
Plaintiff( s)

Case Number 140400111
Judge S.~uel D. McVey

vs.

CADE M. KRUEGER, an individual, and John
Does 1 through 100
Defendant(s)

This matter came before the Court for oral argument on Defendant Cade M. Krueger, s

("Defendant") Motion to Dismis~ on March 31, 2014. Plaintiff Educators Mutual Insurance
Association ("Plaintiff,,) was represented by its counsel of record, Randall R. Smart_

and Jeffrey

A. Callister, attorneys at law~ of Smart, Schofield, Shorter & Lunceford, a Professional

Corporation, and Defend~nt was represented by his counsel of record, Stephen F. Edwards of,
Morgan, Minnock, Rice & James, L.C. The Court having heard oral argument and being fully

advised ori the premises, and based
on Defendant's Motion ·to Dismiss and the Memorandum
in
.
..

1
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Support of said Motion, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, and Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Utah Code~- Section 31A-21-108 is a specific part of the Utah Cod~ meant to

deal with Insurance Com~any Plaintiffs in the subrogation context.
2.

In regard to the determination as to whether or not Plaintiff has standing in this

matter, Utah Code Ann. Section 3 lA-21 -1 08 applies and Utah Code Ann. Sections 78B-2-105,
78B-3-106 and 78B-3 -107 do not apply.
3.

Pmsuant to Uta~ Code Ann. Section 3 lA-21-108, an insurer may bring an action

to subrogate in yither its name or the name of its insured.
4.

· Plaintiffs insured, the late Jessica Wilson, specifically agti."eed in her insurance

policy with Plaintiff that Plaintiff was entitled to recovery against a third-party tort feasor.

5.

Plaintiff has standing to file this lawsuit.

6.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied.

•

•

Approved as to form:
MORGAN, MTNNOCK, RICE

Isl STEPHEN F. EDWARDS

&

JAMES,

L.C.

(wlTH PER1v0ss10N)

Stephen F. Edwards
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of April, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDrn to be served on each of the following people:
Persori's Name and Address

Method of Service

Jeffrey C. Miner
Stephen F. Edwards
Morgan, Minnock & James, L. C.
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Court E-Filing Notification

Clerk of Court
Third District Court
SaJt Lake County, Salt Lake Department
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Electronic Filing

Isl Susan Strunk
Legal Assistant
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EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT - VERNAL

UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AGCS MARINE INSURANCE COMPA.N¥ vs .

AQLER HOT OIL S~RVICE · INC

:ASE N'CWIBER 150800020 Property Damage

::GRRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
EDWIN T PETERSON
?Al<.TIES
Plaintiff - AGCS MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY
Represented by: 'l'HOMAS M REGAN
Plaintiff -

GRE;AT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPA

Represented by: MARK D TAYLOR
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN
Represented by: BRANDEE R LYNCH

Plaintiff - JESUS OLIVERA
Represented by: MARK p TAYLOR
Represented by: THOMAS M ~GAN

Plaintiff -

LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE

Represented by: THOMAS M_REGAN

Plaintiff -

N~TIONAL AMERICAN INSURANCE

Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN

Plaintiff -

PEERLESS INDEMNITY INSURANCE C

Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN

Plaintiff -

SENTINEL INSURANCE COMPANY

Represented by: KENNETH W MAXWELL
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN

Plaintiff - SNELSON COMPANIES INC
RP.prP-sP-nted by: MARK D TAYLOR
Rcpre:Ge:nted by: THOMAS M REGAN
Represented by: BRANDEE R LYNCH

Plaintiff - ST PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE COMP
Represented.by: JOHN H COLTER
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN

Plaintiff Represented
Represented
Plaintiff Represented

v,,,)

TODD DEETZ
by: THOMAS M REGAN

by: DAVID A REAY
WEATHORFORD US LP
by: THOMAS M REGAN
?rinted: 08/26/16 11:48:56
Page 1

:::ASE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage
Represented by: RYAN R JIBSON
Plaintiff. -· ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY ·
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN
Plaintiff - WESTERN NATIONAL ASSURANCE COM
\
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN
Plaintiff - AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN
Pl~intiff - ANDY REPPOND
Represented by: GRETCHEN H JOHNS
Plaintiff - BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE CO
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN.
Plaintiff - CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS
Represented by: KENNETH W MAXWELL
Represented by; THOMAS M REGAN.
-Plaintiff - FARM BUREAU PROPERTY & CASUALT
Represented by: TRENT J WADDOUPS
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN
Plaintiff - FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE
Represented by: KENNETH W MAXWELL
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN
Plaintiff - FLINT ENERGY SERVICES INC
.
.
Represented by: GRETCHEN H JOHNS
Plaintiff - CRAIGS ROUSTABOUT SERVICE INC·
Represented by: TERRY M PLANT
Represented by: JEREMY M SEELEY
Repres~nted by: MATTHEW D CHURCH
.
·Plaintiff. -· ·DALB-RNI HOLDINGS INC
Represented by: TERRY M PLANT
Represented by: JEREMY M SEELEY
Represented by: MATTHEW D CHURCH
Plaintiff - ~ORTH SALES COMPANY INC
Represented by: TERRY M PLANT
Represented by: JEREMY M SEELEY
Represented by: MATTHEW D CHURCH
Plaintiff - FACTORY MUTUAL INSURANCE
Represented by: KIRSTEN S GRISWOLD
Plaintiff - NABORS COMPLETION AND PRODUCT! - DISM!SSED ·
Represented by: KIRSTEN S GRISWOLD
Plaintiff - EMM REALTY OF UTAH LLC
?rinted: 08/26/16 11:48:56
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:ASE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damag~.
Represented by: L RICH HUMPHERYS
Represented_ by: MICHAEL D JOHNSTON
Represented by: RYAN R BECKSTROM

Defendant - ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE INC
Represented by: JONATHAN L HAWKINS
Represented by: JOSEPH·E MINNOCK
Defendant - CHANDLER MANUFACTURING INC
Represented by: PAUL"M BELNAP
Represented by: RYAN P ATKINSON
Represented by: CHET W NEILSON
Doing Business As - TODD D~ETZ ENT (DEETZ, TODD)
Third Pty Cmplainant - AUTO OWNERS INSURANCE CO ASO R
Represented by: LARRY·R WHITE
Represented by: PAUL D VANKOMEN
Represented by: ELLIOT B SCRUGGS
\CCOUNT SUMMARY

TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:

765.00

Balance:

0.00

765.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S

Amount Due:

360.00

Amount Paid:
Amount Credit :

360.00

· Balance:

0.00

0.00

CIVIL
"REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: JURY DEMAND
2so. oo·
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
250.00
Amrnmt Credit:
0.00
0.00
Balance:
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: 3RD PR'T.'Y CMPLT 10K -IAmount Due:
155.00
Amount Paid:
155.00
0.00
Arnount·credit:
0.00
Balance:
?ROCEEDINGS
)2-26-15 Filed: C~mplaint
?r-inted: ~B/26/16 11·:48: 56
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:ASE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage
)2-26-15 Case filed
)2-26-15 Judge EDWIN- T PETERSON assigned.
)2-26-15 Fee Account created
)2-26-15

)2-26-l~
)2-26-15
)2-26-15
)2-27-15

)2-27-15
)2-27-15
)2-27-15
)3-02-15

)3-02-15
)3-03-15

)3-03-15
)3-06-15

)3-06-15
)3-17-15
)3-17-15

B-17 lS
)3-20-lb
)3-20-15

)3-20-15

.)3-20-15
)3~23-15
)3-23-15
)3-23-15

?rinted:

Total Due:
360.00
!-'ee Accuw1L .created
Total Due:
250.00
COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
Payment Received:
360.00
.JURY DEMAND - CIVIL
Payment Received:
250.00
Filed: Returniof Electronic Notification
Filed: Motion to Intervene/Join fn behalf of Auto Owners
Insurance, A/S/0 Ronald Horrocks
Filed: Amended Complaint
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed return: Acceptance of Service upon JOSEPH E. MINNOCK for
Party Served: ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE INC
Service Type: Personal
.Service Date: March 02, 2015
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Appearance o_f Counsel/No_tice of Lipiited Appearance:
Notice of Entry of Appearance of Counsel
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Appearance of Counsel/Notice of Limited Appearance for
Farm Bureau Property Casualty Company
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Request/Notice to Submit for Decision {Intervening
Plaintiffs Motion to Intervene - Unopposed)
Filed: .order (Proposed) Granting Filing of Intervening
Complaint by Auto Owners Insurance Co., A/S/0 Ronald Horrocks
J:i'iled: RGturn of Elec.:LL<.)Hic Notificati nn
Filed: .Notice of Appearance
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed order: ·order Grant.ing Filing c;>f Intervening Complaint by
Auto Owners. Insurance Co., A/S/0 Ronald Horrocks
Judge EDWIN T PETERSON
Signed March 20, 2015_
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
~iled: Appearance of Counsel/Notice of Limited Appearance
Notice of Appearance_of Ryan R. Jibson
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Answer and Reliance on Jury-Demand
08/26/16 11:48:56
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~1\.SE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage
ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE INC
J.3-23-15 Note: Certificate of Readiness for Trial dlle 04/04/2016
)3-23-15 Filed: NOTICE Oll EVENT DUE! DATES

)3-23-15 Filed: Return of RlP-ctronic Notification
)3-26-15 Filed: Third Party Complaint Intervening Complaint, of Auto
Owners Insu~ance Co.
)3-26-15 Fee Account created
· Total Due:
155.00
Payment Received:·
155. 00
)3-26-15 3RD PRTY CMPLT 10K +
)3-26-15 Filed: Return of E~ectronic Notification·
)3-26-15 Filed: Appearance of Counsel/Notice ul Limited Appeara.11ce David
Reay for.Todd Deetz
)3-26-15 Filed: Return of· Electronic Notification
)3-26-15 Filed: Appearance of Counsel/Notice
)3-26-15
)3-30-15

)3-30-15

)3-30-15

)3-30-15
)3-30-i5

J3-30-15

0£ Limited Appearance in

behalf of Auto Owners Insurance Co., A/S/O·Ronald Horrocks
Filed: Return of.Electronic Notification
Filed: Motion Pro Hae Vice Admission of Mersfelder and Consent
of Local Counsel
Filed by: FACTORY MUTUAL INSURANCE,.
Filed: Motion Pro Hae Vice Admission of Pollock and Consent of
Local Counsel
.Filed by: FACTORY MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Filed: Order (Proposed) Granting Mersfelder Pro Hae Vice
Admission
Filed: Order (Proposed) Granting Pollock Pro Hae Vice Admission
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Fj, leq. order: Order Grant.i.ng Men:felder Pro Hae Vice .l\.dmission
L1udge EDWIN T PETERSON

Signed Ma:t:ch 30, 2015 ·
B-30-15 Filed o.r:tle.r:: Order Granting Pollock Pro Hae Vice Admil:!slon
lJudge EDW lN T PETERSON

)3-30-1.S
)3-30~15

·~

)4-01._ 15

)4-01-15
")4-02-15

'@)

?rinted:

Signed MaL·t:!11 30, 20l!J
Filed: Return of Electronic Notific~tion
Filed: Return of Electronic NotificationFiled: Appe~rance of Counsel/Notice uf Limited Appearance
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification·
Filed: Ap~earance of Counsel/Notice of Limited Appearance.
Notice of Appearance of Counsel for Craigs.Roustabout Service,
Inc., Dalbo-RNI Holdings, I~c., and Kenworth Sales Co.
08/26/16 11:48:56
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::ASE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage
)4-02-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)4-29-15 Filed: Motion:

)4-29-15

)4-29-15
)4--30-15

)4-30-15
)5-04-15
.)5-07-15
)5-19-15

)5-19-15
)6-01-15

)6-01-15

)6-01-15
)6-04-15

. )6-04-15
.)7-15-15

)7-15-15
)0-04-15

Stipulation.of Dismissal for Nabors Completion
and Production Services with Prejudice
Fil-.ed by:. NABORS COMPLETION AND PRODUCT!,
Filed: Order (Proposed) of Dismissal for Nabors Completion and
Production Services' with Prejudice
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed order: Order of Dismissal for Nabors Completion and ·
Production Services ~ith Prejudice
Judge EDWIN T PETERSON
Signed.April 30, 2015
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
~ismissed party - NABORS COMPLETION AND
Filed: SECOND NOTICE OF EVENT DUE DATES
Filed: Appea~ance of Counsel/Notice of Limited Appearance
Notice of Appearance
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Motion Pro Hae Vice Motion and consent of_ sponsoring
local counsel for pro hac vice admission of Kenneth Januszewski
Filed by: ST PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE COMP,
Filed: OrdP.r {Proposed) Proposed Order of admission of pro hac
vice attorney
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed order: Order Proposed Order of admission of pro hac vice
attorney
,Judge F.DWTN T PETERSON
signed June 04, 2ois
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed return: Accepr.~nr.P- of Service upon ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE
for
P~r,ty Served: am.NDLER MANUFACTURING INC
Service Type: Personal°
Service Date: July 15, 2015
F'iled: Return of Electr~nic Notification
h'iled: Anawcr of Chandler Mfg., LLC to PlaintifffJ .runended
Cpmplaint and Rella.nee on Jury Demand
CHANDLER MANUFACTURING INC

)8-04-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification

?rinted: 08/26/16 11~48:56
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:ASE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage
)B-11-15 Filed: Motion to.Consolidate Actions
Filed by: CHANDLER MANUFACTURING INC,
)8-11-15 Filed: MP.mor~ndum in _Support uf Motion to Consolicate Actions
)8-11-15 Filed: Exhibit i to Memorandum in Support of ·Motion -to
Consolidate Actions
)8-11-15.Filed: Exhibit B to Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Consolidate· Actions

~

~

.;;;

JB-11-15 Filed: Exhibit c to Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Consolidate Actions
)8-11-15 Filed: Exhibit D to Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Consolidate-Actions
)8--11-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)8·-24-15 Filed: Memm;andum Plaintiffs Response Memoran_dom of
Non-Opposition to Defendant Chandler MF~-, LLCs Motion to
Consolidate Actions
)8-24-15 Filed: Proof of Service
)8-24-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
L0-05-15 Filed: ·Request/Notice to.Submit Motion to Consolidate Actions
L0-05-15 Filed: Return of Electronic.Notification
L0-21-15 Filed order: Ruling and Order w/Cer.tificate of Notification
Judge EDWIN T PETERSON
Signed October 2l, 2015
~2-01-15 Filed: Substitution of Counsel
l2-0l-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
l2-07-15 Filed: Proposed Stipulated Schedule Order Thereon
L2-07-15 Filed: Proof of Service
L2-07-15 Filed: O~der (Proposed} Proposed Stipulated Sc~edule Order
rrhereon.
L2-07-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
I ?.-1.5-15 Filed order: Order Proposed Stipulated Schedule Order Thereon
,Junge EDWIN T PETERSON
Signed Decernbe~ 15, 2015
l2-l5-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)1-21-16 Filed: Initial Disclosures
)1-21-lG Filed: Proof of Service
)_1-21-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)l-2l-16 Filed: Initial Disclosures, Todd Deetz
)1-21-16 Filed: Certificate of Service: Initial Disclosures, Todd Deetz
)1-21-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
. · Page 7
?rinted: 08/26/16 11:48:56

:ASE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage
)1-22-16
n-22--16
)1-22-16
)1-22-+6

Filed:
Initial Disclosures Reppond Flint
Filed:
Cert of Service Initial Disclosures: Reppond Flint
Fi'led: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Certificate of Service for Plaintiff Factor Mutual
Insurance Rule 26 Discl'osures
)~-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)1-22-16 Filed: CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF INTERVENING PLAINTIFF AUTO
OWNERS INSURANCE CO., A/S/0 RONALD HORROCKS INITIAL DISCLOSURES
)1-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)1-22-16 Filed: : COS Great American Insurance Co Initial Disclosures
Jl-22-16 Filed: Return of _Electronic Notification
)1-22-16 Filed: :· COS Snelson: Companies Initial° ·Disclosures
Jl-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Jl-22-16 Filed: Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs Certain
Underwriters At Lloyds, Fire Insurance Exchange and Sentinel
Insurance Company Initial Rule 26(a) (1) Disclosure Stateme~t
Jl-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)1~22-16 Filed: Certificate of Service on EMM Realty of Utah LLCs Rule
26 Initial-Disclosures
)1-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
.
Jl-22-16 Filed: Plaintiffs Craigs Roustabout Service, Inc.s, Dalbo-RNI
Holdings, Inc., and Kenworth Sales Companys Initial Disclosures
and Preliminary Designation of Expert Witnesses
)1-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)1-22-16 Filed: Certificate of Service of Weatherford U.S., LPs Rule
26(a) (1) I~itial_Disclo~ures
Jl-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)1-22-16 Fi.lP.d: COS Fann Bureau R26al
Jl-?.~-1 fi Filed: Return of Electron·; c Notification
J1~26-l6 Filed: certificate of Service
)1-26-16.Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)2-05-16 Fi:I Ad; Certificate· of Serv:ic·!A of ·EMM Realty of Utah LLCs Fin=it:
Set of InL~1:rugatories and Request for Product:i on of Documents
to Each Plainti.ff Asserting a Subrogation C.Laim
.
.
).2-05-16 Fi.led= Certificate of Servi c:P. of ?MM Realty of Utah LLCs First
Set of Interrogatories and RP.quest for Production of Documents
to Defendants·
)2-05-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)2-05-16 Filed: Amended Certificate of Service on EMM Realty of Utah
?rinted: 08/26/16 11:48~56
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::ASE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage

)2-05-16

)2-05-16
)2-10-16

)2-10-16
)2-10-16
)2-10-16

)2-10-16
~

)2-12-16
)2-l;}.-16

)2-12-16
@

)2-12-16
)2-26-16

)2-26-16
)2-26-16
)2-26-16
)2-29-16

)2-29-16

)2-29-16
)2-29-16
)2-29-16

)2-29-16
)3-01-16

?rinted:

LLCs First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production
of Documents to· Each Plaintiff Asserting a Subrogation Claim
Filed: Amended- Certificate of Service on EMM Realty of Utah
LLCs First S~t of IuLerrogatories and Requests for Production
of Documents to Defendants
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission and Consent of Local
Counsel
Filed by: FACTORY MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Filed: Order (Proposed) for Pro Hae Vice Admission and Consent.
of Local.Counsel
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed order: Order for Pro Hae Vice Admission and Consent of
Local Counsel
Judge EDWIN T PETERSON
Signed February 10, 2016
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Appearance of Counsel/Notice of Limited Appearance:
Notice of Entry of Appearance of Counsel Brandee Lynch
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: : cos Jesus Oliveras Initial Disclosures
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Certificate of Service (Initial Disclosures of Chandler
Mfg., LLC)
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: : COS: Defendant Adler Hot Oil Service, Inc.s Rule
26(~) (1) Initial Disclosures
Filed: Return of Electronic·Notification
Filed: Motion to Join Insureds a.s Plaintiffs Pursuant to URCP
17 (a) _and 21
Filed by: WESTERN NATIONAL ASSURANCE COM,
Filed: Memorandum ISO Pltfs Motion to Join Insureds as
Plaintiffs Pursuant to URCP 1·7 (a) and 21
Filed: Certificate of Service
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Motion to Join Sub3:0~03:s_ as Named Plaintiffs
Filed by: FARM BUREAU PROPERTY & CASUALT,
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Motion to Join Subrogor Robert Horrocks as a Party
08/26/16 11:48:56
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~~SE NUMBER 150800020 Prope~ty Damage
Pursuant to U.R.C.P. li(A), 21
Filed by: AUTO OWNERS INSURANCE CO ASO R,
)3-01-16 F.i.lt=u:· Rt=Lun1 of Electronic Notification
)3-01-16 Filed: Mot~on Sentinel Insurance Companys, Certain Undcrwritero
at Lloyds, and Fire- Insurance Exchanges Motion to Join
SulJL·ugors as Parties Under U.R.C.P.17 (aj ,21
Filed by: FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANG~,
)3-01-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)3-01-16 Filed: Motion:
Factory Insurance Companys Motion to Pursue
Previously Asserted Claims in the Names of_.Its Insureds
Filed by: FACTORY MUTUAL INSURANCE,
)3-01-16 Filed: Order (Proposed) Regarding Factory °Insurance Companys
· Motion to Pursue Previously Asserted_ Claims in the ··Names of Its
Insureds
)3-01-16 Filed: Motion:
Great American Insurances Motion to Join
Insured as Plaintiff and Memo in Support
Filed by: GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPA,
)3-01-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)3-01-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)3-02-16 Filed: Motion to Amend
Filed by: "ST PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE cqMP,
)3-02-16 Filed: Memorandum ST. PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANYS
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE INSUREDS NAME
AS PARTY IN INTEREST
)3-02-16 Filed: Order (Proposed) ORDER GRANTING ST. PAUL MERCURY
INSURANCE COMPANYS MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE INSUREDS NAME AS PARTY
IN INTEREST
)3-02-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)3-04-16 Filed: Certificate of Service
)3-04-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)3-04-16 Filed: : COS Great.American Ins Co Responses and Objections to.
EMM Realtys First Set .IRPDs
)3-04-16 Filed: Return of Electrqnic Notification
)3-04-·16 Filed: Certificate of Service of Discovery Responses
)3-04-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)3-04-16 Filed: : Certtificate of Service of Discovery Responses
)3-04-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)3-04-~6 Filed: COS responses to EMM int~rrogs RfP .
)3-04-16 Filed: Return of.Electronic Notification
?rinted: 08/26/16 11:48:56
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~

)3-04-16 Filed: Certificate of Service for Factory Insurance Response to
EMM Discovery
)3-04-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)3-07-16 Filed: : Certificate of Service of Defendant-Adler Hot Oil
Services, Inc.s First Set of Requests for Production of
Documents to·EMM Realty of Utah
)3-0'l-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)3-08-16 Filed order: Order Regarding Factory Insurance Companys Motion
to Pursue Previously Asserted Claims in the Names af Its
Insureds
Judg_e EDWIN T PETERSON
Sign!:=d March 08 ,· 2016
)3-08-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
B-08-16 Filed: ObjecLlon to Entry of Orde~. Regarding Factory Mutual
Insurance Cornpanys Motion to Pursue Claims Previously Asserted
in the Names of Its Insureds
)3-08-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
B-09-16 Filed: Cos Auto Owners Ins Response to HMM J::t'irst Set of
Inter.rogatories and RfPoD
)3-09-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)3-ll-i6 Filed: Chandler Mfg., LLCs Joinder to EMMs Objection to Entry
of Order Regarding Factory Mutual Insurance Cornpanys Motion to
Pursue Claims Previously Asserted in the Names of its Insureds
)3-11-16 FilE;=d: Retu_rn of Electronic Notification
)3-11-16 Filed: Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing Factory Mutual_
Insurance Company and Sentinel Insurance Companys Claims
Against Defendants; and
Filt?.d by: EMM rmALTY OF UTAH LLC,

11-16 Filed: Ret1.1rn of Electronic Notification
JJ·-11-lG Fj_led: Proof of ServicP.
)3-11-16 Fi.led: Return of Elcctronlt.! Notification
n 14-16 Filed: Opposition to Motions to Add insureds as ParLles
)3-14-16 Filed: Return of Eler.tronic .Notification
)3--14-16 Filed: Certificate of Service
)3-14-16 Filed·: Return of Electronic Notification.
)3-18-16 Filed: Certificate.of Servi~
)3-18-16-Fiied: __Return of Electronic Notification
)3-22-16 Filed: Reply in support of Fann Bureaus Motion to Add Subrogors
as. Parties
Page 11
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::ASE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage
)3-22-16 Filed: Request/Notice to Submit re: Plaintiffs Motion· to Add

Subrogors as Parties
)3-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification

1,-?.7.-16 Filed: Reply ST. PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANYS REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO SUBS'l1TTUTE INSUREDS NAME AS PARTY IN
INTERES'r
)3-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)3-25-16 Filed: Opposition to:

Factory Mutual Insurance Response to EMM

Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Factorys
Motion to Purs-µe Claims _in the the Name of their Insureds
)3-25-16. Filed:_Factory opposition to EMM MSJ Exhibits 1-6
)3-25-16 Filed: Factory opposition to EMM MSJ Exhibits 7-13 ·
)3-25-16 Filed: Factory opposition to EMM MSJ Exhibits 14-17
)3-25-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)3-25-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)3-25-16 Filed: Memorandum In Opposition to EMM Realty of Utahs MSJ and

Reply Memo In Support of Mot.ion to Pursue Claims In Name of
Insured
)3-25-16 Filed: Exhibit 1 to Memo In Opposition to MSJ
:>:\-25-1 fi Filed: Exhibit ~ to M~mo In Opposition to MS,J

)3-25-16 Filed: .l:!:Xhibit.s 3-10 Lo Memo In Oppusllion to MSJ
)3

-25-16 Filed: Return of :g!lectronic Notif_ication

)3-25-16 Filed: Exhibits 11-12 to Memo In Opposition to MSJ
)3-25-16 Filed: Exhibits 13-14 to Memo In Opposition to MSJ

)3-25-16 Filed: EY..hibits 15-25 to Memo In Opposition to MSJ
)3-25-16 Filed: Ret.urn of Electronic Notification
)3-28-16 Filed: AUTO OWNERS INSURANCE CO., A/S/O RONALD HORROCKS REPLY

" NAMF. AS A PARTY IN
IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO JOIN INSUREDS
INTEREST
)3-28-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
B-28-16 Filed: Reply lu Support' of Plaintiffs Motion ·to Join Their ·
Insureds as Plaintiff$ Pursuant to URCP 17(a) ~d 21
)3-28-16 Filed: Certificate of Service ·
)J-20-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Not:i ficat.ion
)J

30 16 Filed:

: COS: Defend.~•,:nt-. Adler Hot Oil Service, Inc. s Rccpons~:::

to EMM Realty of Utahs First Set. of Discovery Requests
)3-30-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)4-01-16 Filed: Reply Memorandum· in Support of EMM Re.alty of Utah LLCs
Motion for Summary Judgment Dismiss~ng Factory Mutual Insurance
?rinted: 08/26/16 11:48:56
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Company and· Sentinentel Insurance Companys Claims Against
.Defendants
)4-01-16 Filed: Exhibit.A to Reply Memorandum in Support of EMM Realty
of Utahs Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing Factory Mutual
Im:mrance Company and Sentinel Insurance Companys Claims
Against Defendants
)4-01-J 6 Filed: R~_t-urn of Electronic ·Notification
)4-11-16 Filed: Request/Notice to Submit for Decision (1) Factory Mutual
and Sentinels Motions to Join Subrogors As Parties and (2)-EMM·
Realtys Matin for Summary Judgment Dismissing Factory Mutual
and Sentinels Claims Against Defendants
)4-11-16 filed_: Return of Electronic Notification
)4-11-16 Filed: Certificate of Service of Discovery Served Upon
Defendant Chandler Mfg., LLC
)4-11-16 Filed: Request for Hearing /to Submit EMM Realtys Motion for
Summary Judgment Dis~issing factory and Sentinel Insurance with
Oral Argument Requested
)4-11-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)4-11-16 Filed:·Return of Electronic Notification
)4-21-16 Filed: Sentinel Insurance Companys, Certain Underwritecs at
Lloyds.and Fire Insurance ExchangeG Errata To Correct Title Of
Motion Tu Bt= Cunsistent With Relief Sought
)4-21-16.Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)4-25-16 Filed: Certificate of Serv~ce: EMM Realty of Utah LLCs Response
to Defendant Adler Hot Oil Services, Inc Firs~ Set Of Requests
for Production of Documents
)4-25-16 Filed: Return.of Electronic Notification
)4·-·?.9-16 pjJ.ec~: Mnt:.ion for Protective Order.
j4-?.9-16

v,)

)4-29-16
)4-29-16
)4-29-16

)·4-29--16

vi

ViiiJ

)5 ··02-16

)5-02-16
)5-09-16
?rinted:

Filed by: ADLER H01 .. OIL SERVICE INC,
Filed: Ri:::::Luu1 u[ Electronic .NotificQ-tion
Filed: Stipulation for Dismissal
Filed: Request /Notice to Submit Request to Submit
Filed: Order (Proposed) Order· of Dismi~Ral
Filed: R~turn of Electronic: Nnt.ification
Filed order: Ordr!r of Dicmissa+
JµJge EDWIN T .PETERSON
Signed May 02, 2016 ·
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Certificate of Service (De[ei1da11.t Chandler Mfg.; LLCs
08/26/16 11:48:56
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JS-09-1.6

)5-13-16

·
)5-13-16

)5-13-16
)5-20-16
)5-20-16
)5-23-16

)5-23-16
)5-24-16

)5-24-16
)5-26-16

)5-26-16

)5-26-16
)6-07-16
)!5-07-16
)G-07--16
)6-10-16

)6-10-16

·)6-10-16

)6-10-16

Responses to Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, Fire Insurance
Exchanges, and Sentinel Insurance Companys First Set of
Requests for Admission)
Filed: Return of Electroni.c .Notification
Filed: Request/Notice to Submit: Request to Submit for
~oecision:.Motion for Prot~uLlve Order
Filed: Order {Proposed): Protective Orde~~
..
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Request/Notice to Submit To Submit For Decision
Fil~d: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Certificate of Service {Defendant Chandler Mfg;, LLCs
Responses to Plaintit'fs Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, Fire
.
.
Insurance Exchanges, and Sentinel Insurance Company~ First _Set
of interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents)
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed order: Order: Protective Order
Judge EDWIN T PETERSON
Signe~ May 24, 2016
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Notice of Rule 30(b) (6) Deposition_of Adler Hot Oil
Services, ·Inc., and Adler Hot Oil Services, LLC
Filed: Notice of Rule 30(b) (6) Video Conference. DP.position of
Chandler Mfg., LLC,· f/k/a Chandler Manufacturing Inc.
Filed: Return of Electronic Notifiqation
Filed: Proof of Service of Discovery Requests to Adler
Filed: Proof of 8ervice of Discovery Requests to Chandler
Filed: Return of Electronic :Notificnt::ion
Filed: Other ·· Not Siqned Order (Proposed) ORDRR GRAN'l'ING ST.
PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANYS MOTION TO SUBSTITU'l'B INSUREDS
NAM~ AS PARTY"TN INTEREST
Nule: A n.1 I ing .ind order on tl1.i~ iE:E;ue will be fmtered. sho.r..·tl y.
Filed: Return of Elet.:LL'OlliG Notification
Filed order: Rulih~ and Or~er
Judge EDWIN T PETERSON
..

Signed ~up.e 10, 2016
)6~10-16 MOTIONS HEARING/ORAL ARGUMENTS scheduled arr July 18, 2016 at
01:30 PM-in ROOM 2· with Judge PETERSO~.
)6-10-16 Notice-. NOTICE for Case 150800020 ID 17504817

MOTIONS HEARING/ORAL AR.GUMENTS is scheduled.
?rinted: 08/2?/16 11:48:57
Page 14

Q

c:

"'ii

::'.ASE·NUMBER

1soaooo20

,Property Damage

Date: 07/fB/2016.
Time : 0 l : 3 O p . m.
·Location•: ROOM• 2
Ven1al District Court
920 East Hwy 40

Vcn~al, UT

84078

Before Judge: EDWIN T PETERSON
)6-10-16 Filed: Notice for Case 150800020 ID 17504817
)6-21-16 Filed: Certificate of Service (Chandler Manufacturings First
Set of Interrogatories· and Requests for Production of Documents
to Adler Hot Oil Services)
)6-21-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)7-01-16 Filed: Motion for Leave to Appear Teleph~nically for Oral
Argument
Filed by: WESTERN NATIONAL ASSURANCE COM,
)7~01-16 Filed: Proof of Service
)7-01-16 Filed: Order (P~oposed} Regarding Motion for Leave to Appear
Tel_ephonically for Oral Argument
)7-01-i6 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)7-03-16 Filed order: Order Regar~ng Motion for Leave to Appear
Telephonical1y for Oral Argument
Judge EDWIN T PETERSON
Signed July 03, 2016
)7-03-16 Filed: Return of Elec~ronic Notification
)7-05-16 Filed: Certificate of Service Chandler MFG Responses To
Plaintiffs AGCS Marine Insurance Companys, Allstate Indemnity
C~mpa.uys,. American Family Insurances, RP-:1r River Mutual
Insurance Comp~ys, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company
)7 05-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notif1cation
)7-06-16 Filed: Certij:icate of Service (Chandler: M[g.s Second Set of
InterrogatoricG and Requests fr.:,r Prod1.1r.t:ion of Documents to
Adler Hot Oil Services)
)7 ·· 06-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)7-l4-16 Filed: Certificate of Service (Chandler Mfa., TiT,C.s rrhird Set of
. · Interrogatorie~ und Requests for Production of Documents t.o
Adler Hot Oil Servi·ces}
Y/-14-16 Filed: Return of ElE!ctronic• Notification
)7-15-16 Filed: Certificate of Service (-Defendant Chandler Mfg., LLCs
Responses to Plaintiff EMM Realty of Utah, LLCs Requests for
-?rinted: 08/26/16 11:48:57
Page 1s·"

:ASE NUMBER 150800020 Pr.operty Damage
Production of Documents and Interrogatories)
')7-15-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)7-18-16 TE~EPHONIC STATUS CONFERENCE scheduled on December OS, 2016 at
01:00 ,PM in ROOM 2 with Judge PETERSON.
)7-18-16 M1nute Entry - MOTIONS HEARING/ORAL ARGUMENTS
Judge:
EDWIN T PETERSON
Clerk:.
brianl
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney{s}: MATTHEW D CHURCH
L RICH HUMPHERYS
RYAN R JIBSON
GRETCHEN H JOHNS
MICHAEL D JOHNSTON
BRANDEE R LYNCH
KENNETH W MAXWELL
THOMAS M REG.AN
MARK D TAYLOR
TRENT J WADDOUPS
Defendant's Attorney{s): RYAN P ATKINSON
JOSEPH E MINNOCK
Audio
Vcrn2
Tape Count: 3:07:25
~ape Number:

. G;1

Thomas Regan appears teiephonically. Dart Winkler and Kenneth
Januszewski appear pro.hac vice. The Court hears from counsel. A·
resolution may have been reached, and the issues are discussed wiLh
the Court. Thi R matter is set fur Telepl1.onic Status Conien:!li.Ce on
12/05/2016 at 1 p.m. Mr. T,. Ric?ll Humpe1.··yc will prepare .:i.n order
b~~P.n on today;s proceedings.
{3:32:53)
C\
\r::'

TIME: 3:07:25 PM

TELEPHONIC STATUS CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date;_ 12/05/2016

Time; 01:00 p.m.
Location: ROOM.2
Vernal District Court
?rinted: 08/26/16 11:48:57
Page 16

:ASE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage

~

920 East Hwy 40
Vernal, UT 84078
Before Judge: EDWIN T PETERSON
)7-20-16 Filed: Notice of Depositions of Ryan Runolfson, RMon
Chamberlain, and Adler Hot Oil Services, LLC
)7-20-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)7-20-16 Filed: ; Certificate of Service for Snelson Companies First
Supplemental Initial Disclosures
)7-20-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)7-26-16 Fil_ed: Amended Notice of Depositions of Ryan Runolfson, RMon
Chamberlain, and Adler Hot Oil Services, LLC
)7-26-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)7-27-16 Filed: : COS: Defendant Adler Hot Oil Services, Inc.s Responses
to EMM Realty of Utahs Request.s for Production of Documents and
· Interrogatories to Adler Hot Oil Services, Inc., and Adler Hot
011 Services, LLC
)7-27-16 Filed: : COS: Defenqant Adler Hot Oil Services, Inc.s Responses·.
to Chandler Manufacturing, LLCs First Set of Interrogatories
and Requests for Production of Documents to Adler Hot Oil
Services
)7-27-16. Fi1Bd: : COS: Defendant Adler Hul O.i.l St7:i-vices, I.uc.o Responser;
to Chandler Manufacturing, LLCs Second Set of Interrogatories
and Requests for Production of Documenls to Adler. Hot Oil
Services
)7-27-16 Filed: : COS: Defendant Adler Hot Oil Services, Inc.s Responses
to Chandler Manufacturing; L~Cs Third Set of _Interrogatories
and Requests for Production of Documents to Adler Hot Oil
Services
)7-27-16 Filed: : COS: Defendant Adler Hot Oil Services, Inc., and Adler
Hot oil Services LLCs Responses to AGCS M~rine Insurance
Company, et als, Fir~t Set of Interrogatories and Requests for
Productinn of Documeuls
)7-27-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)7-29-16 Filed: Certificate of service Plaintiff EMM Realty of Utah LLCs
FlLst Supplemental Disclosures
)7-29~16 Filed: Return of El~ctronic Notification
)8.-01-16 Filed: : Not;i.ce ot° Deposition
Robert Lapiii
)8-01.-16 Filed: Return o~ Electronic Notification
)8-03-16 Filed:
Notice of Deposition of Jesus Olivera
?rinted: 08/26/16 11:48:57
P~ge 17
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:ASE NUMBER 150800020 Prop~rty Damage
)8-03-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
)8-10-16 Filed:
)8-10-16 Filed:
)8-17-16 Filed:
)B-17-16 Fiied:
)B-23-16 Filed:
)8-23-16 Filed:
)8-2S--16 Filed:
)8-25-16 Filed:
)8-25-16 Filed:
)8-25-16 Filed:
)8:-25-16 Filed:

Notice of Telephone Conference
Return of Electronic Notification
: Amended Notice of Deposition
Return of Electronic Notification
: Amended· Notice of Deposition of Jesu~ Olivera
Return of Electronic Notification
: Amended Notice of Deposition of Jesus Olivera
: Amended Notice of Deposition of Robert Lapin
Return of Electronic Notification
Adler Hot Oil Designation of Rule 30 (b) (6) Witnesses
Return of Electronic Notification
:

?rinted: 08/26/16 11:48:57
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ADDENDUM D(2)

Thomas M. Regan (#09642)
COZEN O'CONNOR
501 West Broadway, #1610
San.Diego, California 92101
Telephone: 619.234.1700 .
Toll Free Phone: 800.782.3366
Facsimile:- 619.234.7831
tregan@cozen.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
· AGCS Marine Insurance Company; Allstate
Indemnity Company; American Family
Insurance; Bear River Mutual Insurance
Company; Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance
Company; National American Insurance;
Peerless Indemnity Insurance Company; and
Western National Assurance Company

*Additional counsel and their clients are set forth in Exhibit 1 attached hereto.
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT UNITAH COUNTY
1

STATE OF UTAH

AGCS MARINE INSURANCE COivIPANY;
- ALLSTATEINDEMNITYCO:MPANY;
AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE; ANDY
REPPOND; BEAR RIVER MITTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY; CERTAIN
UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS; FARM
BUREAU PROPERTY & CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY; FIRE INSURANCE
EXCHANGE; FLINT ENERGY SERVICES,
INC.; GREAT AlvIERICAN INSURANCE
COMPANY; JESUS OLIVERA; LIBERTY

MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE CO1v.lPANY;
NATIONAL AMERICAN INSURANCE;
PEERLESS INDEMNITY INSURANCE
COMP ANY; SENTJNEL INSURANCE

)
)
)
)

)

)
)
)

)
)
)

)
)
)

COMPANY; SNELSON COMPANIES, INC.;

)
)
)

ST. PAUL 11ERCURY INSURANCE

)

CO:rv!PANY; TODD DEETZ D/B/A TODD
DEETZ ENT; WEATHERFORD U.S., LP;
WESTERN NATIONAL ASSURANCECOMPANY;FACTORYMUTUAL

)
)
)
)

l.EGAL\22273547\1
LEGAL\22281258\1

Civil Case No.: 150800020
Complaint Filed: Fe~ruary 26, 2015

AMENDED COMPLAINT

JURYDEMAND

INSURANCE CO:MPANY; CRAIG'S
ROUSTABOUT SERVICE, INC.; NABORS
COMPLETION AND PRODUCTION
. SERVICES CO.; DALBO-RNIHOLDINGS,
INC.; and KENWORTH SALES COMPANY.

)
)
)
)
)

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)
)

v.

)

ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC., a Utah
)
corporation; CHANDLER MANUFACTURING,)
INC., a Texas corporation; and DOES 1 through
50, inclusive,
Defendants.
Plaintiffs AGCS MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY; ALLSTATE INDEMNITY
COMPANY; AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE; ANDY REPPOND; BEAR RIVER
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS; FARM
BUREAU PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY; FIRE INSURANCE
EXCHANGE; FLINT ENERGY SERVICES, INC.; GREAT AMERICAN lNSURANCE
CONIPANY; JESUS OLIVERA; LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY;
NATIONAL AMERICAN INSURANCE; PEERLESS INDEMNITY INSURANCE
COMPANY; SENTINEL INSURANCE CO:MPANY; SNELSON COMPANIBS, INC.; ST.
PAUL l\1ERCURY INSURANCE COMPANY; TODD DEETZ D/B/A TODD DEETZ ENT;
WEATHERFORD U.S., LP; WESTERN NATIONAL ASSURANCE COMPANY; FACTORY
MUTUAL INSURANCE CO:MPANY; CRAIG'S ROUSTABOUT SERVICE, INC.; NABORS
CO:MPLETION AND PRODUCTION SERVICES CO.; DALBO-RNI HOLDINGS, INC.; and
KENWORTH SALES C01v.1PANY. ("Plaintiffs") are informed and believe, and thereon allege
against Defendants, and each of them, as follows:

- 2"'
LEGAL\22273547\1
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
. 1.

This action arises out of a fire and/or explosion ("Explosion") that occurred on or

about March f-, 2013 at 4907 South 4625 East, Vernal, Utah, 84078 ("Premises'').
2.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and venue is proper in this Court

pursuant to U.C.A. § 78B-3-307.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS·
3.

At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiffs were, and are, persons who sustained

damages and/or injury as a result of the Explosion or the insurance companies of persons who
sustained damage and/or injury as a result of the Explosion. Plaintiffs include business who, at
all times relevant, were and are authorized to conduct and transact business in the State of Utah
and insurance companies authorized to conduct and transact business in the State of Utah as an
insurance carrier and who provided insurance benefits to their insureds for damages caused them
by the Explosion. The individual Plaintiffs are as follows:

a.

Jesus Olivera

b.

Andy Reppond

c.

Todd Deetz

d.

Weatherford U.S., LP

e.

Nabo~s Completion and Production Services, Co.

f.

Craig's Roustabout Services, Inc.

g.

Dalbo-RNI Holdings, Inc.

h.

Kenworth Sales Company

. -3LEGAL\22273547\1·
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4.

At all times herein mentioned, ADLER HOT O~ SERVICE, INC. was, and is, a

coiyoration authorized to conduct and transact business in the State of Utah.
5.

At all times herein mentioned, CHANDLER MANUFACTURING, INC. was,

and is, a corporation authorized to conduct and transact business in the State of Utah.
6.

DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, are sued herein by their fictitious names. Plaintiffs

believe that such DOE defendants are responsible, in whole or part, for the incident and damage
hereinafter alleged. PJaintiffs will amend this Complaint to properly identify such defendants
once their identities become known to Plaintiffs.
7.

Plaintiffs are inf01med and believe and thereon allege that, at all times herein

mentioned, each of the defendants were the agent, servant, representative, or employee of each of
the remaining defendants, and were at all times acting within the purpose and scope of said
agencies, service or employment with the consent, permission or approval of each of their co-

defend ants in committing the acts and omissions herein alleged.
8.

On or about March 2, 2013 the Explosion occurred on Defendant ADLER HOT

OIL SERVICE, INC.'s premises at 4907 South 4625 East, Vemal, Utah, 84078.
9.

The Explosion caused bodily injury ("Subject Injury") or damaged real and

personal property ("Subject Property") belonging to Plaintiffs and/or insured by Plaintiffs
("Subject Losses"), in amounts to be proved at trial
10.

At the time of ~e Subject Losses, there were in effect insurance policies issued by

the insurance company Plaintiffs to their respective insureds which insured against losses of the
types alleged to have been sustained herein.

-4LEGAL\22273547\1
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11.

Stubbs Oil Company, Inc. w~s insured by St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company.

Stubbs Oil Company, Inc. suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for
some, but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged.
12.

Chapman Construction was insured by AGCS Marine Insurance Company.

Chapman Construction suffered damages to real and personal property, and· was insured for
some, but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged.
13.

Matt Betts !rocking, Inc., was insured by Western National Assurance Company.

Matt Betts Trucking, Inc., suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for
some, but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged.
14.

William and Linda Milholland were insured by Bear River Mutual Insurance

Company. William and Linda Milholland suffered damages to real and personal property, and
was insured for some, but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged.
15.

Travis Johnson was insured by Allstate Insurance Company. Travis Johnson

suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for some, but not all, personal
and real property lost or damaged.
16.

Split Mountain Travel Plaza, Inc., was insured by Peerless Indemnity Insurance

Company, suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for some, but not all,
personal ana real property lost or damaged.
17.

Warren Equipment Company was insw-ed by Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance.

Warren Equipment Company suffered damages to real and personal pl'operty, and was insured
for some, but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged.

-5LEGAL\22273547\1
LEOAL\22281258\1

18.

Todd Deetz d/b/a Deetz Ent (Enterprises) was insured by Certain Underwriters at

Lloyds. Todd Deetz suffered damages io personal property, and was insur~d for some, but not
all, personal property lost or damaged.

19.

Snelson Companies, Inc. suffered damages to real and personal prope11y, and was

insured for some, but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged.

20.

~MM Realty of Utah, LLC was insured by Sentinel Insur_ance Company. EMM

Realty of Utah, LLC suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for some,
but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged.

21.

EMM Realty of Utah, LLC was also insured by Factory Mutual Insurance

Company. EMM Realty of Utah, LLC suffered damages to real and personal property, and was
insured for some, but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged.
22.

Flint Energy Services Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of

business in Houston, Texas. Plaintiff Flint Energy Services Inc. was uninsured. Plaintiff Flint
Energy Services Inc. suffered damages to business property, and was uninsured for all business
property lost or damaged.
23.

Andy Reppond is an individual residing in Marion, Union Parish, State of

Louisiana. Andy Reppond was uninsured. Andy Reppond suffered damages to his business .
property and personal property, and was uninsured for all business and personal property lost or
damaged.
24.

Weatherford U.S., LP is a limited partnership organized and existing under the

laws of the State of Louisiana, and is authorized to conduct and transact business in the State of
Utah. Weatherford U.S., LP suffered damages to real and personal property, and was uninsured
for all property lost or damaged.

-6LEGAL\22273547\l
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25.

DM Brown Construction was insured by Farm Bureau Property & Casualty

Insurance Company. DM Brown Construction suffered damages to real and personal property,
and was insured for some, but not all, personal ·and real property lost or damaged.
26.

Marcia Luck was insured by Farm Bureau Prope1ty & Casualty Insurance

Company. Marcia Luck suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for
some, but not all, personal aud real property lost or damaged.
27.

Loren S. Richins was ipsured by Fann Bureau Property & Casualty Insurance

Company. Loren S. Richins suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for
some, but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged.
28.

Maralee Richens was insured by Fire Insurance Exchange.

Maralee Richens

suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for some, but no~ all, personal
and real property lost or damaged.
29.

National Oilwell Varco was insured by Factory Mutual Insurance Company.

National Oilwell Varco suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for
some, but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged.
30.

Brady Trucking was insured by Great American Insurance Company.

Brady

Trucking suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for some, but not all,
personal and real property lost or damaged:

31.

Aztec Well Servicing was insured by National American Insurance. Aztec Well

Servicing suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for some, but not all,
personal and real property lost or damaged.

-7l.EGAL\22273547\1
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32.

Marsha and Ten-y Dugan were insured by American Family Insurance. Marsha

and Terry Dugan suffered damages to real and personal property, and were insured for some, but
not all, personal and real prope1ty lost or damaged.
33.

Nabors Completion and Production Services, Co., is a corporatiort brganized
0

aria

existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, and is authorized to conduct and transact
business in the State of Utah.

Nabors Completion and Production Services, Co. suffered

damages to real and personal property, as well as business intenuption and loss of revenue.

34.

Craig's Roustabout Services, Inc., is a corporation organized and existing under

the laws of the State of Utah, and is authorized to conduct and transact business in the State of
Utah. Craig's Roustabout Services, Inc. suffered damages to real and personal property, as well
as business interruption and loss of revenue.

35.

Dalbo-RNI Holdings, Inc., is-a corporation organized and existing under the laws

of the State of Delaware; and is authorized to conduct and transact business in the State of Utah.
Dalbo-RNI Holdings, Inc. suffered damages to personal and business property, as well as
business interruption and loss of revenue.

36.

Kenworth Sales Company is a corporation organized and existing under the laws

of the State of Utah, and is authorized to conduct and transact business in the State of Utah.
Kenworth Sales Company suffered damages to real and personal property, as well as business
intepuption and loss of revenue.
37.

Pursuant to the terms of the aforementioned insurance policies and claims for

benefits filed thereunder by Plaintiffs' insured parties, the insurance company Plaintiffs paid to
their respective insureds amounts exceeding one millio~ dollars ($1,000,000), amounts to be
proven at trial.
-8LEGAL\22273547\1
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38.

Pursuant to the terms of the aforementioned insurance policy, equity, and by

operation of law, the insurance company Plaintiffs are subrogated to the rights of their insured
parties to ~e amounts paid as a result of the losses, in amounts to be proven at tiial.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Negligence Against Defendants ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC.; CHANDLER
l\tIANUFACTUR.ING, INC.; and DOES 1 through SO, Inclusive)
39.

Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference allegations 1 through 12 as though.

fully set forth herein.
40.

Defendant ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC. heats and pumps fluids at high

pressure to circulate and clean oil and gas processing equipment. Services include pumping fluid
down well bores, treating well bores with chemicals, and maintaining bot oiling rods, tubing, and

flow lines.
41.

CHANDLERMANUFACTIJRING, INC. manufactures oilfield equipment.

42.

At the time of the explosion, Defendant ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC.

leased or owned and was operating a truck manufactured by CHANDLER MANUFACTURING,
INC. ("Subject Vehicle"). The Subject Vehicle was mounted with propane tanks.
43.

Defendants

ADLER

HOT

Oil..

SERVICE,

INC.

and

CHANDIER

MANUFACTURING, JNC. were under a duty of care to exercise due and reasonable care and
caution in the maintenance and operation of the Subject Vehicle.

-9LEGAL\22273547\1
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44.

Defendants

ADLER

HOT

OIL

SERVICE,

INC.· and

CHANDLER

MANUFACTURING, INC. breached the aforementioned duty ·~ough one or more of the

following_ acts and/or omissions:
a.

carelessly and negligently failing to maintain the Subject Vehicle, in

violation of the Utah Code including but not limited to U.C.A. § 41-6a- 1601 such that it had a
dangerous propensity to ignite~ fire and/or cause an explosion;
b.

carelessly and negligently servicing the Subject Vehicle such that it had a

dangerous propensity to ignite
c.

afire and/or cause an explosion;

carelessly and negligently performing repair work on the Subject Vehicle

such that it had a dangerous propensity to ignite a fire and/or cause an explosion;
d.

carelessly and negligently inspecting the Subject Vehicle such that it had a

r
I
i

dangerous propensity to ignite a fire and/or cause an explosion;
e.

carelessly and negligently operating the Subject Vehicle and its propane

tanks such that it had a dangerous propensity to ignite a fire and/or cause an explosion; and
f.
45.

were otherwise careless and negligent in acting or failing to act.

Defendant ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE,

rnc.

negligently filled the propane

tanks to their capacity or beyond in the cold outside environment and then moved them into a
heated garage for overnight storage.
46.

Defendant ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC. knew or should have known that

the difference between the ·outside temperature and the temperature in the garage would cause
the propane gas to expand and leak into the garage, making it likely a fire or explosion would
result.

-10LEGAL\22273547\1
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47.

Defendant CHANDLER MANUFACTURING, lNC. sold or leased the Subject

Vehicle to Defendant ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC.

48.

Defendant CHANDLER MANUFACTURING, INC. knew or should have known

that the Subject Vehicle's manufacture and/or design would cause propane gas to leak if used in
the foreseeable manner Defendant ADLER HOT

oa SERVICE, INC. used it.

As a· direct and proximate result of the aforementioned negligent acts or omissions

49.

to act, the Explosion occuned causing the damage and injury alleged herein.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Strict Liability - Abnormally Dangerous Activity Against Defendant
ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC. and DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive)
50.

Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference allegations 1 through 23 as though

fully set forth herein.
51.

Defendant's activities in operating, controlling, managing, and/or maintaining the

Subject Vehicle constituted an abnormally dangerous activity.
52.

Defendant's activities posed a high degree of risk of some harm to the Subject

Property. Defendant filled two propane tanks to capacity or beyond while outside in cold
temperatures, sealed them, and moved and left them in a heated garage. Because propane gas is
highly flammable and is known to expand in warm temperatures, Defendant's activities posed a
f>

high degree of risk of harm to neighboring persons and property, including Plaintiffs.

53.

It was likely that any. harm caused by Defendant's activities would be great

because Defendant's activities increased the likelihood that a fire or explosion would occur and
fires and explosions inherently cause significant damage to surrounding property. Further,
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Defendant left the propane tanks unattended for the night, undoubtedly delaying response time in
the case of fire or an explosion and thereby increasing the likelihood of severe damage.
54.

Defendant's activities were such that Defendant could not elinrinate the risk

I

l
I

through the exercise of reasonable care. Defendant's method of filling propane tanks to their
capacity or beyond · and leaving them in a heated garage unattended is characterized by an
inability to eliminate the risk of great harm by the exercise of reasonable care.
55.

Defendant's activity is not one 9f common usage because it is_ not customarily

carried on by the great mass of mankind or by many people in the commll:nity. Both Defendant_'s
business services and specific method of filling and st01ing flammable propane gas are
uncommon.
56.

Defendant's activities on March 2, 2013 were inappropriate considering the place

they were carried out. Defendant parked the truck with the propane tanks in a garage near
residences. In fact,. after the explosion and ensuing fire, law enforcement had to evacuate
residents living within a half-mile of the site.
57.

The dangerous attributes of Defendant's activities outweigh the value of

Defendant's activities to the community'. The risk of expiosion and fire caused by Defendant's
practices outweigh the value of clean oil and gas processing equipment because the risk is to not
only property, butI) people's lives. In November 2010, there was a similar explosion and• fire at the
same building. The blast injured two people and caused two million dollars in property damage.
58.

Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs' insureds were damaged by the fire and/or explosion

which was a direct result of Defendant's abnormally dangerous activities in operating and
maintaining the Subject Vehicle.

- 12LEGAL\22273547\1
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59.

Plaintiffs' damages were the type of haim that would _ be anticipated as a result of

the risk created by Defendant's abnormally dangerous activities. Specifically, the Explosion was
the type of harm that would be anticipated as a result of leaking propane gas.
60.

Defendant's abnormally dangerous activity resulted in an explosion and fire and

was a substantial factor in causing damage and destruction alleged herein, in amounts to be
proved at trial.

TIDRD CAUSE OF ACTION.
(For Private Nuisance Against Defendant ADLER HOT OIL

SERVICE, INC. and DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive)
61.

Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference allegations 1 through 34 as though

fully set forth herein.
62.

Defendant's activities in operating, controlling, managing, and/or maintaining the

Subject Vehicle constituted a private nuisance.

63.

Defendant's activities caused a substantial and unreasonable intetference with the

private use and enjoyment of the property of Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs' insureds.
64.

Defendant's activities posed significant risk of great harm to the Subject Property.

The activities posed a significant risk of explosion and fire, which would likely greatly damage

any surrounding property.
65.

Defendant's activities ultimately caused great damage to the Subject Property,

interfering with the use and enjoyment of the S~bject Property. As a result of the damage,
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Plaintiffs, of Plaintiffs, insured parties were required to relocate their homes and businesses, and
repair portions of the Subject Property.

66.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned acts or omissions to act,

the Explosion took place resulting in damages alleged here:in, in amounts to be proved at trial.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Trespass Against Defendant ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC.
and DOES 1 through SO, Inclusive)
67.

Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference allegations 1 through 40 as though

fully set forth here:in.
68.

Defendant trespassed on the Subject Property.

69.

Defenda!lt entered and remained on the Subject Property when Defendant caused

shock waves from the Explosion to enter and permanently damage the Subject Property.
70.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned acts or omissions to act,

portions of the Subject Property suffered the damages and injury alleged herein, in amounts to
be proven at tiial.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Strict Product Liability for Manufacturing or Design Defect Against Defendant

CHANDLER MANUFACTURING, INC. and DOES l through SO, Inclusive)
71.

Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference allegations 1 through 45 as though

fully set forth herein.
72.

Defendant designed and manufactured the Subject Vehicle.

73.

The Subject Vehicle had design and/or manufacturing defects that made the

product umeasonably dangerous.
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74.

The manufacture and/or design of the Subject Vehicle made it more likely that

propane gas would leak out from the propane tanks. Allowing the tanks to be stored on top of
one another allowed the lower tank to be overfilled. The liquid level gauge was difficult to see,
as it was located on top of the upper tank. The tanks were designed to be filled beyond the level
established by applicable laws, codes, and government and industry standards.
75.

The defect(s) were present at the time Defendant manufactured, sold, or

distributed the Subject Vehicle.

76.

The defect(s) were causes of Plaintiffs' injuries and damages.

77.

As a direct and proximate result of the defects, the injury and damages alleged

herein took place in amounts to be proven at trial.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Negligent Product Liability for Manufacturing or Design Defect Against Defendant
CHANDLER MANUFACTURING, INC. and DOES 1 through 50~ Inclusive)
78.

Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference allegations 1 through 52 as though

fully set forth herein.
79.

Defendant designed and manufactured the Subject Vehicle.

80.

The Subject Vehicle had a design and/or manufacturing defect that made the

product unreasonably dangerous.
81.
82.

· The defect(s) were the result of Defendant's failure to use reasonable care.
The manufacture and/or design of the Subject Vehicle made it.more likely that

propane gas would leak out from the propane tanks. Allowing the tanks to be stored on top of
one another allowed the lower tank to be overfilled. The liquid level gauge was difficult to see,
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as it was located on top of the upper tank. The tanks were designed to be filled beyond the level
established by applicable laws, codes, and government and industry standards.
83.

The defect(s) were present at the time Defendant manufactured; sold, or

distributed the Subject Vehicle.
84.

The defect(s) were causes of Plaintiffs' injuries and damages. ·

85.

As a direct and proximate result of the defects, the Explosion occurred causing the

injury and damages alleged herein, in amounts to be proven at trial.

-~

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Strict Product Liability for Failure to Warn Against Defendant CHANDLER
MANUFACTURING, INC. and DOES 1 through SO, Inclusive)
86.

Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference allegations 1 through 60 as· though

fully set forth herein.
87.

Defendant had a duty to warn about a danger from the Subject Vehicle's

foreseeable use of which Defendant knew or reasonably should have known and that a
reasonable user would not expect.
88.

Defendant failed to provide an adequate warning at the time the product was

manufactured, distributed, or sold. Defendant did not supply instructions or warnings for filling
the tanks. Defendants did not supply instructions or warnings for filling the tanks in cold
conditions and then moving the tanks into a warmer environment.
89.

The lack of an adequate warning made the product defective and unreasonably

dangerous.
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90.

The lack of an adequate warning was a cause of Plaintiffs' injuries and damages.

91.

It was foreseeable that one would fill the tanks to capacity because the design and

manufacture of the Subject Vehicle allowed them to be filled to capacity.

92.

A reasonable user would not expect the Subject Vehicle to leak propane gas and

cause an explosion.

93.

As a direct and proximate result of the failure to warn, the Explosion took place

causing the injury and damages alleged herein in amounts to be proved at trial.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Negligent Product Liability for Failure to Warn Against Defendant CHANDLER
MANUFACTURING, INC. and DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive)

94.

Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference allegations 1 through 68 as though

fully set forth herein.
95.

Defendant had a duty to warn about a danger from the Subject Vehicle's

foreseeable -use of which Defendant knew or reasonably should have known and that a
reasonable user would not expect.
96.

Defendant failed to exercise reasonable care because he failed to provide an

adequate warning at the time the product was manufactured, distributed, or sold. Defendant did
not supply instructions for filling the tanks. . Defendants did not supply instructions or warnings

for filling the tanks in cold conditions and then moving the tanks into a warmer environment.
97.

The lack of an adequate warning made the product defective and unreasonably

dangerous.
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98.

The lack of an adequate warning was a cause of Plaintiffs' injuries and damages.

99.

It was foreseeable that one would fill the tanks to capacity because the design and

manufacture of the Subject Vehicle allowed them to be filled to capacity.
100.

A reasonable user would not expect the Subject Vehicle to leak propane gas an~

cause an explosion.
101.

As a direct and proximate result of the failure to warn, the Explosion occurred
f:.'\

'-IV

resulting in the injury and damages alleged herein in amounts to be proved at trial.

JURY DEMAND and PRAYER
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38, Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants and each of them as
follows:
1.

For compensatory damages in an amount to b~ proven at trial;

2

For prejudgment interest, costs and attorney's fees as permitted by law; and

3.

For such other relief as the Court may deem just and fair.

Respectfully submitted this 27 th day of Febiuary, 2015.
COZEN O'CONNOR

By:-----------Thomas M. Regan
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
AGCS Marine Insurance Company; Allstate
Indemnity Company; American Family
Insurance; Bear River Mutual Insurance
Company; Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance
Company; National American ·Insurance;
Peerless Indemnity Insurance Company; and
Western National Assurance Company
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ADDENDUM D(3)

AGCS Marin,_e Insurance Company, et al. v. Adler Hot Oil Service, Inc., et al.
Exhibit 1 to Amended Complaint
Kenneth W. Maxwell (#6609)
BAUMAN LOEWE WITT & MAXWELL, PLLC
87 65 E. Bell Road, Suite 210
Scottsdale,AZ 85260
Telephone: 480-502-4664
Facsimile: 480-502-471"4=
kmaxwell@blwmlawfirm.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Certain Underwriters at Lloyds; Fire Insurance Exchange; Sentinel
Insurance Company

Mark D. Taylor (#9533)
LEWIS HANSEN
The Judge Building, Suite 410
Eight East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone:· 801-746-6300
Facsimile: 801-746-630 l
mtaylor@lewishansen.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Great American Insurance Company; Jesus Olivera; Snelson Companies,

Inc.
Trent 1. Waddoups
CARR & WADDOUPS
609 Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: 801-363-0888
Facsimile: 801-363-8512
trent@cw-law.net
Attorneys for Plaintiff Fann Bureau Property & Casualty Insurance Company

Gretchen H. Johns
902 East Hwy 40, Suite 216
Vernal, UT 84078
Telephone: 949-413-0338
gretchenjohns.law@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs Andy Reppond and Flint Energy Services, Inc.
David Reay
LEGAL\22281269\1

MILLER, REAY & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
43 West' 9000 South, Suite B
Sandy, UT 84070
Telephone: 801-997-0529
Facsimile: 801-206-0211
david@reaylaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Todd J?eetz, d/b/a Todd Deetz Enterpiises

Ryan R. Jibson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
222 South Main Street, Suite 2200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: 801-799-5967
Facsimile: 801-214-2090
rrjibson@hollandhart.com

r

Attorneys for Weatherford U.S., LP

Harrison Colter
COLTER JENNINGS
333 South 520 West, Suite 350
Lindon, UT 84042
Telephone: 801-932-6162
harrison @colterj en.rungs. com
[\

Attorneys for St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company

'o/iiiJ

Terry M. Plant #2160 .
Jeremy M. Seeley #12653
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
Facsimile: (801). 531-9747
~mail: tplant@pckutah.com
j seeley@pckutah.com
Attorneys for Craig's Roustabout Service, Inc., Dalb-RNIHoldings, Inc., Kenworth Sales
Company, Inc.,
-

-~
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·~ ..

,@

Kirsten S. Griswold #12656
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
·136 East South Temple, Suite 170o'
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Tel~phone: (801) 363-7611
-Facsimile: (801) 531-9747
Email: kgriswold-@pckutah.com
Attorneys for Factory Mutual Insurance and Nabors Completion

,®
!

®

@
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and Production Services, Co.

ADDENDUME

Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant.
{a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An
executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an··express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person's name without
joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute so pro~des, an action for the use or
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it
is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for
ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such
ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of
the real party in interest.
(b) Minors or incompetent persons. An unemancipated minor or an insane or incompetent person who is a

party must appear either by a general guardian or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the court
in which the action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any case when it is deemed by the court in
which the action or proceeding is prosecuted expedient to represent the minor, insane or incompetent person in the
action or proceeding, notwithstanding that the person may have a general guardian and may have appeared by the
guardian. In an action in rem it shall not be necessary to appoint a guardian ad !item for any unknown party who
might be a minor or an incompetent person.

(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad litem appointed by a court must be appointed as
follows:
(c)(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if the minor is of the age of fourteen
years, or if under that age, upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor.
_(c)(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if the minor is of the age of fourteen
years and applies within 21 days after the service of the summons, or if under that age or if the minor neglects so
to apply, then upon the application of a relative or friehd of the minor, or of any other party to the action.
(c)(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon motion therefor, shall be entitled to
an order designating some suitable person to be guardian ad litem for the minor defendant, unless the defendant
or someone in behalf of the defendant within 21 days after service of notice of such motion shall cause to be
appointed a guardian- for such minor. Service of such notice may be made upon the defendant's general or
testamentary guardian located in the defendant's state; if there is none, such notice, together with the summons
in the action, shall be seMd in the manner pro~ded for publication of summons upon such minor, if over fourteen
years of age, or1 if under fourteen years of age, by such senAce on the person with whom the minor resides. The
guardian ad litem for such nonresident minor defendant shall have 21 days after appointment in which to plead to
the action.
(c)(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or proceeding, upon the application of a
relati'\ie or friend of such insane or incompetent person, or of any other pa~ to the action or proceeding.
(d) Associates may sue or be sued by common name. When two or more persons ~ssociated in any
business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or other association, not a corporation, transact such
business under a common name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they may sue or be
sued by such common name. Any judgment obtained against the association shall bind the joint property of all the
associates in the same manner as if all had been named parties and had been sued upon their joint liability. The
separate property of an indhAdual member of the association may not be bound by the judgment unless the member
is named as a party and the court acquires jurisdiction over the member.
(e) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a nonresident person is associated in
and conducts business within the state of Utah in one or more places in that person's own name or a common trade
name, and the business is conducted under the_supenAsion of a manager, superintendent or agent the person may
be sued in the person's name in _any action arising out of the conduct of the business.
·

(f) As used in these rules, the tern, plaintiff shall include a petitioner, and the tern, defendant shall include a
res pendent:
·
·

